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ABSTRACT 
Multi-version design (MVD) has been proposed as a method for increasing the dependability 
of critical systems beyond current levels. However, a major · obstacle to large-scale 
commercial usage of this approach is the lack of quantitative characterizations available. Fault 
injection is used to help seek an answer this problem. Fault injection is a phrase covering a 
variety of testing techniques that can be applied to both hardware and software, all of which 
I 
involve the deliberate insertion of faults into an operational system to determine its response. 
This approach has the potential for yielding highly useful metrics with regard to MVD 
systems, as well as giving developers a greater insight into the behaviour of each channel 
' 
within the system. In this research, an automatic fault injection system for multi-version 
systems called FITMVS is developed. A multi-version system is then,tested using this system, 
and the results analysed. 
It is concluded that this appr?ach can yield several extremely useful metrics, such as metrics 
related to channel sensitivity, channel sensitivity to common-mode error, program scope 
sensitivity, program scope sensitivity to common-mode error, error frequency distribution and 
common-mode error frequency distribution. In addition to this, the analysis of the multi-
version system tested indicates that the system has an extremely low probability of 
experiencing common-mode error, although several key points in ch~nnel code are identified 
as having higher sensitivity to faults than others. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
An increasing range of industries has a growing dependence on software-based 
systems. Many of these systems are critical systems developed for safety-critical, business-
critical or mission-critical applications, and it can be seen that failure within such systems has 
the potential to be devastating. 
Given the need for dependability, many software systems still have an unacceptably 
high level of faults. Multi-version design (MVD) has been proposed as a method for 
increasing the overall dependability of software systems above that of those developed using 
traditional approaches. However, a major obstacle to the large-scale commercial rollout of 
MVD systems is the lack of quantitative characterizations of the approach. These are difficult 
to assess, but important, as in most cases resource allocation cannot be done arbitrarily or 
carelessly [KIMOO], and without relevant metrics, sensible resource allocations cannot be 
achieved. 
It can therefore be seen that a concerted effort needs to be made to improve the level 
of empirical knowledge in regard to multi-version systems. This has been done to limited 
effect with traditional testing methods, but the area of fault-injection has been especially 
neglected [VOA97, CHE99]. 
Fault injection as an analysis tool has a number of benefits; for example, it can 
effectively simulate rare events that may not have been considered during a target system's 
testing phase, and is also a very good method for deriving metrics about a system. Currently 
however, most fault injection systems within the software engineering field have concentrated 
on the assessment of single version software, with little or no analysis tools for the detection 
of common-mode failures in multi-channel systems. [CHE99] states that "as far as fault 
injection for diversity evaluation is concerned, the lessons from the literature are limited and 
of a general nature only." 
1.2 Objectives 
This research is centred around the design and development of an automated fault-
injection system for the analysis of multi-version systems, in order to provide a method for 
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easily extracting useful metrics from such a system, as well as facilitating the testing process 
for MVD systems by identifying areas of code with a high sensitivity to common-mode 
failure. A fauit-injection system is developed capable of parsing C and C++ source code, 
injecting faults, compiling the resulting code, automatically testing the code using user-
specified tests, and logging the results. In addition, an existing factory simulation is re-written 
in C++ in order to allow the testing of an existing MVD factory control system to be 
performed much faster. The results outputted by the fault injector are then analysed in order to 
gauge the sensitivity of individual MVD channels to errors as well as their sensitivity to 
common-mode failure. This research also results in good non-commercial fault-injection 
being made available for future studies. 
1.3 Organization of the Remainder of Dissertation 
This chapter (Chapter 1) introduces an overview of the research area of this project, 
and details the structure of the rest of the document. 
Chapter 2 introduces the basic definitions used throughout the thesis and gives a 
detailed definition of the concept of dependability. The traditional software engineering 
approach to developing software, software fault tolerant techniques such as recovery blocks 
and multi-version design, the controversy over multi-version design, and the cost factors of 
MVD systems are also discussed. The chapter concludes by discussing the need for more 
fault-tolerant metrics 
Chapter 3 details the problems associated with traditional testing techniques, the 
background to fault injection, and the differences between fault injection and traditional 
testing techniques. A method for applying fault injection to MVD systems is also discussed. 
Chapter 4 introduces the tool to be developed for this research. It goes on to detail 
the design and operation of the tool, its objectives, its limitations, and portability issues 
associated with it. The chapter ends with a detailed description of the development of the tool 
and the make-up of the test files used by it. 
Chapter 5 describes in detail the factory production cell simulation used to test the 
effectiveness of the fault injection tool developed. The system requirements, operational 
details, and assumptions made by the production cell simulation are also discussed. 
Chapter 6 gives an overview of the experiment performed using the fault injection 
tool. It details the re-development of the production cell simulation in C++, and describes the 
test data used during the experiment. The chapter concludes by describing the extra hardware 
used to combat the large amount of processing time required for each test. 
11 
Chapter 7 details the results of the experiment performed, together with an analysis 
as to what these results mean. The chapter concludes by examining issues that arose from the 
fault injection tool as a result of the experiment. 
Chapter 8 gives the conclusions of the thesis, describes potential future work and 
research directions, and contains acknowledgements. 
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Chapter 2 The Need for Dependable Software 
2.1 Basic Definitions 
Before beginning a detailed discussion, it is first necessary to define a number of 
basic concepts that are related to the areas of dependability, fault tolerance and fault injection. 
These will be used throughout the whole thesis. 
2.1.1 Software systems 
A system may be viewed as a set of components interacting under the control of a 
design (which is itself a component of the system) [LEE90]. Components are themselves 
systems, and receive requests for service and produce responses; when a component cannot 
satisfy a request for service, it will produce an exception. This system model is recursive in 
that each component can itself be considered as a system in its own right and thus may have 
an internal design which can identify further sub-components. 
2.1.2 Errors 
An error can be defined as a discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured 
value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition. Errors 
occur at run-time, when some part of the computer software enters an undesired state. They 
are therefore a property of the state of the system, and cannot be observed easily (unless 
special mechanisms are employed to record the occurrence of some types of events.) 
2.1.3 Failure 
A failure occurs when an error passes through the system-user interface and affects 
the service delivered by the system. A component failure results in a fault (1) for the system 
which contains the component and (2) as viewed by the other components with which it 
interacts; the failure modes of the failed component then become fault types for the 
components interacting with it. 
2.1.4 Faults 
A fault (also referred to as a bug) is a defect that has the potential of generating 
errors. It is a static notion, and the presence of a fault may lead to system failure. 
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In most cases, the fault can be located and removed; in .some cases it remains a 
hypothesis that cannot be adequately verified (e.g. timing faults in 9istributed systems). It is 
important to note the distinction between error detection and fault location; an error shows the 
presence of a defect, but the underlying cause of this defect is ohly identified by a fault 
location process [HAL90]. This process is very much a problem-solVing activity, but it can be 
tackled systematically (see [KER86]). 
2.1.5 System design 
A system design can be considered as the algorithm which is responsible for defining the 
interactions between components, establishing connections between components and the 
system environment, and for providing an supplementary processing for the system to achieve 
its required behaviour. 
2.1.6 Design faults and component faults 
A design fault is the failure of the system desigh algorithm to perform its intended 
function, whilst the failure of a system component to operate according to its specification is 
termed a component fault. 
2.1.7 Related errors 
A related error is a multi-version design specific conjecture whereby the probability of 
a version manifesting an error when another version has manifested an error is greater than 
I 
the probability of the version manifesting an error on its own. This may lead to a higher 
probability of common-mode failure than would be the case if erroJJs within versions were 
independent of each other. 
2.2 Dependability 
Traditional terminology, commonly used by both software epgineers and hardware 
reliability engineers, is often inadequate when discussing software . faults. Some of these 
traditional terms are defined below. 
Reliability Reliability may be defined as the ability of a ·system to perform its 
required functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time. 
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Availability 
Safety 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability is the degree to which a system or' component is operational 
and accessible when required for use. This , is often expressed as a 
probability. 
Safety is the non-occurrence of catastrophi,c consequences on the 
environment. 
Confidentiality is the non-occurrence of the unauthorized disclosure of 
information. 
Integrity is the degree to which a system or component prevents 
' 
unauthorized access to, or modification of, computer programs or data. 
Maintainability Maintainability has two forms : 
1) The ease. with which a software system or component can 
be modified to correct faults, impro've performance or other 
attributes, or adapt to a changed env:ironment. 
2) The ease with which a hardware system or component can 
be retained in, or restored to, a state' in which it can perform 
its required functions. 
The use of these terms is inadequate for several reasons - for example, design faults 
often lack any one useful categorization, whilst the actual identification of a particular aspect 
of a complex system design as being a fault may well be subjective. Also, depending on the 
circumstances, failures of interest could concern differing aspects of the service - e.g. the 
average real-time response achieved or the degree to which deliberate security intrusions can 
be prevented, etc. Hence, there is a need for a more general definition; ideally this should be 
properly recursive, in ord~r to allow adequate discussion of problems :that might occur at any 
level of a system. 
This concept is known as dependability and was first proposed by Laprie in [LAP92]. 
Writing in [RAN95a], Laprie defines dependability as "that property of a computer system 
such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. The service delivered by 
a system is its behaviour as it is perceived by its users". 
Dependability has three characteristics: attributes, means and threats. These are 
illustrated in figure 1. 
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DEPENDABIT..ITY 
ATTRIBUTES 
--+--- ~ANS ---§ 
AVAILABILITY 
RELIABILITY 
SAFETY 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
INTEGRITY 
MAINTAINABILIT Y 
FAULT PREVENTION 
FAULT TOLERANCE 
I 
FAULT REMOVAL 
FAULT FORECASTING 
---E FAULTS THREATS ERRORS FAILURES 
Figure 1 - Dependability 
Dependability is a global concept, and subsumes the attributes of reliability, 
availability, safety, security, maintainability and confidentiality. These attributes enable the 
properties which are expected from a system to be expressed, and allow system quality 
resulting from the threats and means opposing it to be assessed. The means for dependability · 
refer to methods and techniques that enable a system to provide the ability to deliver a service 
on which reliance can be placed, and confidence reached in this~ ability. The threats to 
dependability refer to undesired (but not necessarily unexpected) circumstances resulting 
from undependability. 
Depending on the application, different emphasis may be placed on the various facets 
of dependability within a system; however, regardless of this, it can therefore be seen that 
dependability is not simply a synonym for reliability; rather, reliability is just one attribute of 
the overall concept. 
2.3 The Need for Dependable Software 
As the role of software becomes more and more entrenched in everyday usage, 
software dependability has increasingly come to the foreground. Although faults affect all 
types of software, they are of particular concern when developing safety-critical and real-time 
applications, where a single fault may result in a serious incident. Safety-critical software may 
be defined as any software that can directly or indirectly contribute to the occurrence of a 
hazardous system state. Obvious examples of this include aircraft flight systems and nuclear 
shutdown systems, but this definition also extends to more common applications, such as 
embedded systems within vehicles and domestic appliances, or indeed any system that 
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controls significant amounts of power [ST096]. The cost of failure within such systems is 
invariably high; there are numerous documented examples of suc4 failure, many of which 
have resulted in the loss of human life [LAD99]. Given the increased need for dependability, 
many software systems still have an unacceptably high level of faults. 
In an attempt to reduce this level of faults, the safety Of relying on traditional 
development techniques has been questioned, and alternative development methodologies 
I 
have been proposed. The vast majority of these 'alternative' methods fall into a category 
known as "Software Fault Tolerance". The question of whether such alternative development 
methods result in a more dependable system is multi-faceted and controversial, and is a 
question that this research seeks to further explore. 
2.4 The "Traditional" Software Engineering Approach 
Traditionally, software has been developed using a single variant approach- i.e. all 
the resources available for the development and implementation of a. system (such as time to 
develop and the number of programmers) are concentrated on producing a single, dependable, 
"good" system. 
This method addresses the "fault prevention" attribute of dependability, as it aims to 
prevent (as much as possible) the occurrence of program faults, through good design 
principles and implementation processes. It also addresses the "fault .removal" attribute as it 
places an emphasis on thorough testing strategies with the aim of removing as many faults as 
possible. 
Lack of dependability in such systems has been explained as due to lack of resources 
I 
allocated to the design and development of software, such as the amount of time for 
implementation. This viewpoint suggests that given enough resources,. software dependability 
will be greatly increased. 
This viewpoint has been called a delusion by some commentators, such as [HAT97], 
who argues that different techniques that supposedly promote the goal of improved 
dependability have come and gone, whilst the defect density of software has remained similar 
for more than 15 years. Even high-integrity systems which have had formal specification 
methods and extensive testing applied to them still have faults; the example cited in [HAT97] 
is of an air-traffic control system which, despite it's thorough development, still had a defect 
density of0.7 faults per thousand lines of code. 
Current advances in t)1e field of software engineering, such as 
1 
object-orientation and 
software reuse strategies, attempt to increase the correctness and maintainability of software 
and thus reduce the number of undetected faults within systems. However, these approaches 
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cannot completely eliminate the risk of systems being developed wi~h potentially serious and 
undetected faults. Pressman [PRE97] states that with the advent of object-oriented 
technologies and increased reuse of program components, the amount of system code that 
must be 'built from scratch' may decrease, but the overall size and complexity of systems 
continues to grow. 
The advantage of this development approach is that it is a well-known and well-
understood methodology, with a large number of supporting metrics [KIT90] that can be used 
to justify the approach to management. Perhaps the main disadvaJ;ltage is that, due to the 
reasons given above, it is reasonable to assume that the incidence of faults within software 
systems will remain a problem for the foreseeable future, 
Given this disadvantage, there is a need to investigate alternative approaches in order 
to investigate possible methods to reduce the potential amount of undetected faults within 
applications. 
2.5 Software Fault Tolerance 
The concept of Software Fault Tolerance [L YU95] has become increasingly 
recognized in recent years. Fault tolerant software allows errors to be detected and logged, 
without affecting the running of a system, and potentially offers great improvements in 
dependability over traditional development methods. [A VI85] describes the function of fault-
tolerance: 
' 
" ... to preserve the delivery of expected services despite the presenc~ of fault-caused errors 
within the system itself Errors are detected and corrected, and permanent faults are located 
and removed while the system continues to deliver acceptable service. " 
There are two main approaches to software fault tolerance, d~pending on the goal of 
the system designer; these are either preventing a failure from leading to complete system 
disruption, or ensuring continuity of service. The aim of the former is: to detect an erroneous 
task as soon as possible, and halt it to prevent error propagation- a technique often termed as 
fail-fast [GRA90]. The latter approach requires the use of design diversity; this is defined by 
[AVI86] as 
" .... the production of two or more systems aimed at delivering the same service through 
separate designs and realizations." 
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The majority of fault tolerant methods use design diversity, and as such it is this 
approach that is of interest in this research. Two of the principle techniques in the area of 
design diversity are Recovery Blocks and Multi-version Design. 
2.5.1 Recovery blocks 
The recovery blocks technique is one of the earliest in fault tolerance, and was first 
introduced by [RAN75]. Recovery blocks work on the principle of acceptance testing; on 
entering a recovery block, system state is saved and a primary alternate is executed. An 
acceptance test is then performed to provide adjudication on the outcome of this primary 
alternate. If the acceptance test fails, then backward recovery is performed by the system 
reverting ("rolling back") to its previously saved, and the next alternate is executed. This may 
continue until either an alternate passes the acceptance test, or the final alternate is executed 
and fails the acceptance test. Should the final alternate fail, then the system will fail also. This 
is illustrated in figure 2. Recovery blocks can be nested, and so the raising of an exception 
from an inner recovery block can invoke recovery in an enclosing block. 
The recovery block approach has a number of advantages. It is fault tolerant as errors 
discovered by the acceptance test can be detected, corrected and logged, and the approach can 
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- if necessary - provide gradual degradation of a system, whereby each alternate runs a 
progressively smaller number of services in order to enable the system to pass an acceptance 
test. Also, provided the primary alternate does not fail, additional alternates will not be 
executed, and so the run-time overhead of recovery blocks can be minimal when compared to 
a single-variant system. There is a footprint, but tests by [SHR 78a} [SHR 78b] support the 
belief that recovery blocks do not impose any serious runtime and recovery data space 
overheads - the experiment showed that the run-time overhead ranged between 1 - 11% that 
of T1 (a program with no recovery facilities), provided the primal)\" alternate did not fail. 
Should the primary alternate fail, the time to restore system state was up to 30% ofTl. 
However, the approach also has several disadvantages. For example, the success of 
I 
recovery blocks rests to a great extent on the effectiveness of the error: detection mechanisms 
used, especially (although not solely) the acceptance test. Should the acceptance test be 
faulty, alternates that are correct may be treated as though faulty, and f~mlty alternates may be 
treated as though correct. Also, there is a danger of what is called the· 'Domino' effect. This 
can occur when a system of co-operating processes employs recovery blocks, as each process 
will continually establish and discard checkpoints, and may also need to roll-back to a 
previously established checkpoint. Should recovery and communication operations not be 
performed in a coordinated manner, then the rollback of a process can result in a cascade of 
rollbacks that could push all the processes back to their beginnings. Another potential 
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problem is finding a simple and highly reliable acceptance test that does not involve the 
development of an additional software version; the form of acceptance test depends on the 
application - for example, there may be a different acceptance test for each alternate, 
although in practice only one is usually used. This type of system is not considered 
appropriate for many real-time systems, as it is not feasible to simply 'roll back' the state of a 
system. Also, the nature of the system means execution time is unpredictable, as it depends on 
how many alternates fail the acceptance test. Alternates must not retain data locally between 
calls, otherwise the modules can become inconsistent with each other. The problem is more 
noticeable when attempting to design an alternate as an object. There is no guarantee that the 
state of the object is correctly modified unless the object is invoked each time, although 
[KIM84, KIM95] proposes distributed recovery blocks as a way of circumventing this 
limitation. 
exit 
Discard 
checkpoint 
Establish 
checkpoint 
entry 
Failure eJG::eption 
Recovery Block 
Figure 2 - Recovery block operation 
Although the basic implementation of recovery blocks makes no provision for 
forward error recovery, this is possible, as described by [MEL 77], whilst [CRI82] states that 
forward error recovery mechanisms can support the implementation of backward error 
recovery by transforming unexpected errors into default error conditions. However, this ts 
very much application specific, and so it is often the case that the recovery block approach is 
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inappropriate for systems that require decisions to be made quickly (such as many real-time 
systems). Therefore, when such systems employ a fault tolerant approach, the most common 
methodology used is multi-version design. 
2.5.2 Multi-version design 
Multi-version design was first proposed by [AVI77]. It w,orks on the principle of 
independently implementing n versions of a program (channels), which are then executed in 
parallel with a single input (although conceptually, parallel execution is not necessary -
channels may be executed separately and their results later compared). The outputs of these 
channels are then compared under a voting system, which then forwards a single output based 
on the majority agreement of the channels [KNI86]. This is detailed in figure 3. 
State-Connection Information 
I 
-.I * Version 1 
I 
N I V Consensus Result !!: p ~I Version 2 0 u T 
T E 
I R Fail 
-.I :z Version 3 
Figure 3 - A 3-version voter system 
The multi-version approach has gained attention as a number of researchers have 
documented significantly increased levels of dependability within software developed using 
this methodology, e.g. [AVI89, HAT97] etc. 
There is still much debate over how much of an improvement in dependability the 
approach offers over single variant design. Some researchers have concluded that the 
dependability of software developed using the multi-version 11?-ethodology increases 
dramatically; for example, Hatton's 1997 analysis [HAT97], based on the Knight and 
Leveson experiment [KNI86] concludes that a three-channel version of the system, governed 
by majority polling would have a dependability improvement ratio of 45:1 over a single 
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variant of the system. This is not a new finding; earlier papers, such as [AVI84] have also 
I 
argued that the approach produces highly dependable software. 
2.5.3 The controversy over multi-version design 
Such massive increases in dependability have, however, been drawn into question, 
and much debate has ensued; Knight and Leveson [KNI90] argue that these gains in 
dependability are under the assumption that there are no correlated (common-mode) failures 
I 
within two or more channels of the system- in other words, no faults will occur in the same 
place and produce the same results. Numerous studies, beginning w~th [SC084] have shown 
that this is simply not the case. Eckhardt and Lee's study [ECK85] has shown that even small 
probabilities of correlated faults can reduce the overall dependability of anN-version system 
dramatically, and Leveson [LEV95] further argues that every experim'ent with the approach of 
using separate teams to write versions of the software has found that independently written 
software routines do not fail in a statistically independent way. Examples of this can also be 
found in [ECK91, KEL88]. 
The voting software used in multi-version design must also' be developed correctly 
and free of fault, otherwise the entire system can become unstable. An example of this is the 
NASA study of an experimental aircraft, which found that all of the software problems that 
occurred during flight testing were the result of faults found in the redundancy management 
system, and not the control software itself [MAC88]. 
Therefore, it appears to be the case that such massive dependcibility gains can only be 
assumed on a theoretical level. In real-world applications, the overall cost/dependability ratio 
is likely to be much lower for a multi-version system than the theoretical model may suggest. 
The factor of cost therefore becomes important, as the extra cost required to develop n 
versions of a system may not result in an equivalent increase in system dependability. 
2.5.4 Cost factors of multi-version design 
The cost of developing multiple versions is not n times the cost of developing one 
version, but also n times the cost of maintenance, which c~n be very high. Although 
arguments have been advanced that the increase in cost will be less than n [VOU90], Leveson 
' 
[LEV95] argues that these rest on the assumption that some aspects of the software 
development process will not have to be duplicated; also, many aspects of the processing and 
outputs have to be specified with more detail than usual, in order to make the results 
comparable, thus requiring that the specification phase take more time and effort than usual. 
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This therefore increases the overall algorithmic complexity of the project, which may again 
have an impact on the cost of the project as a whole. 
[MAC91] argues, using a number of different calculations, tpat it can be the case that 
an imperfect 3-version voter system will be less cost effective than a simplex (i.e. single-
version) system, although it would be as dependable; this assumes th~t all versions have equal 
development costs, whilst [LAP90] calculates that the cost of developing a 3-version system 
over a simplex system is at least 178% more costly, and can be as much as 271% more costly; 
on average, such a system would be 225% more expensive, although the 3-version system is 
more dependable. 
It is not simply enough to implement n verswns of a program if the resources 
allocated to that implementation are not substantial enough; the dependability of a multi-
version system is directly related to the dependability of its indiv!dual channels. [KNI86] 
states: 
" ... one might note that even in the hardware Triple Modular Red~ndancy (TMR) systems 
from which the idea of N-version programming arises, overall system reliability is not 
improved if the individual components are not themselves sufficiently reliable." 
The emergence of software reuse libraries, whereby reusable software components 
may be bought and used to create large, dependable software systems very quickly, shows 
much promise for relatively cheap, fast creation of different chanriels within a N-version 
system; however, at present, although such software libraries exist, their price has yet to reach 
an acceptable level and the number of components available is still quite limited. Although 
software libraries may help to drastically reduce the cost of developing N-version systems in 
I 
the future, at present their impact on the cost of developing N-version systems is quite small. 
It therefore appears to be the case that although an N-v~rsion system provides 
dependability that is at least equal (and usual superior) to that of an equivalent single version 
system, the cost is invariably higher. 
2.5.5 Other FT methods based on RB and MVD 
Although there are other fault tolerant methodologies, most are in some way based 
upon either the recovery block or the multi-version approach. For example, consensus 
recovery blocks [SC085] and retry blocks [AMM87] both have th~ir origins within the 
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recovery block approach, whilst acceptance voting [ATH89], n self-checking programming 
[LAP90] and n-copy systems [AMM87] are closely related to multi-version design. 
2.6 The Need for Fault Tolerant Metrics 
At present, there is very little empirical evidence as to which methodology (single-
variant or fault tolerant) yields the most dependable system. Tlie knowledge of which 
methodology is more dependable is very important - especially in industry - due to the 
increased cost associated with developing a fault tolerant system over a single-variant system. 
Although much is known about assessing the dependability of single-variant systems 
[LAP95], lack of empirical evidence is especially acute when considering fault tolerant 
systems. For example, in a recent paper, [KIMOO] states that "effective, let alone optimal, 
resource allocation is not possible in the absence of quantitative characterizations of FT 
schemes", and goes on to state that "One can says that FT approaches not yielding to easy 
quantitative analyses are unsafe to use. Using such approaches is a blind exercise of an art." 
This work seeks to develop a method for obtaining metrics from fault tolerant 
systems in order to better assess their dependability, and help build a more accurate 
dependability model for such systems. Systems that require the highest levels of dependability 
are invariably within the safety-critical domain, and are therefore us1,mlly real-time systems. 
Because of this, the use of recovery blocks is sometimes inappropriate (although schemes 
such as distributed recovery blocks [KIM95] help to address this problem), and so system 
designers frequently have to choose between multi-version design and the single-variant 
approach. Often, the single-variant approach is chosen due to the lack of empirical evidence 
regarding multi-version dependability - given the fact that multi-version systems may offer 
only a slight increase in dc;pendability over single-variants, it is unknown whether the 
increased cost of developing such a system is worth the extra dependability gained. Therefore, 
this research will concentrate on developing a method for ascertaining the dependability of 
multi-version systems; derivatives of this method, such as n-copy and n self-checking systems 
will not be investigated, as these systems are less commonly applied in industry. Once a 
firmer understanding of the basic multi-version method is obtained, further investigations will 
be able to apply the technique developed to these systems. 
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter begins by defining basic terms and concepts that will be used throughout 
the thesis, and gives a detailed definition of the concept of dependability. The traditional 
software engineering approach to developing software is then discussed, and both its 
advantages and disadvantages are explained. Software fault tolerant techniques such as 
recovery blocks and multi-version design are then discussed together with their respective 
advantages and disadvantages. The controversy over multi-version design is then described, 
and a discussion on the cost factors ofMVD systems is given. The chapter concludes with the 
case for the need for more fault-tolerant metrics. 
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Chapter 3 Fault Injection 
3.1 Problems with Traditional Testing 
·The vast majority of multi-version systems exist within the safety-critical domain. 
Within this domain, extremely high levels of dependability often need to be guaranteed; for 
example, [CHR94] states that the failure rate of these systems is usually required to be "in the 
order of 10-8 - 1 o-10 failures per hour". Unfortunately, it may be the case that traditional 
testing alone will not be able to adequately guarantee these levels of, dependability. [HEC96] 
states that demonstrating that the failure rate of an item does not exceed x per hour requires 
"approximately 1.5/x hours of test time under the most optimistic assumptions (no failures 
and a high risk test plan)", and [BUT93] estimates that this would take thousands of years of 
testing to demonstrate (assuming one copy of software would be testt7d and one failure would 
be observed). Also, most multi-version systems are highly complex, and it is often infeasible 
to perform the enormous amount of test cases required to test every possible input and system 
state; according to [VOA95], "the number of tests required for establishing high reliability 
are impractical if not impossible for software of even modest complexity". Another weakness 
of traditional testing is that it often fails to exercise a systems response to rare (i.e. unlikely) 
events. A number of studies, such as [HEC93] and [HEC94] have shown that many failures in 
well-tested systems are caused by such events. The same data from these studies also shows 
that multiple rare events are almost the exclusive cause of the most c;ritical failures in these 
systems. 
Traditional testing may therefore never reveal any faults in such a system and it is a 
truism that non-exhaustive testing cannot reveal the absence of faults. This is a problem, as it 
not only means that a system's high levels of dependability cannot necessarily be guaranteed, 
but also makes comparisons between high-dependability single-version and multi-version 
systems extremely difficult. 
3.2 Fault Injection 
With this in mind, a different approach to testing is perhaps re'quired. Fault injection 
has been proposed as an approach that addresses these limitations. Fault injection is a phrase 
covering a variety of testing techniques that can be applied to both hardware and software, all 
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of which involve the "deliberate insertion of faults into an operational system to determine its 
response" [CLA95]. Once this has been performed, an examination of the system for 
resulting errors and failures occurs, such as analysis of interactions between system 
components and of the resilience of the system against known faults. Fault injection is a "late 
life-cycle" software analysis [VOA98a] that can simulate human operator errors and observe 
their impact on the software as well as the total system. It is a technique that complements, 
but is not a substitute for, other verification and validation procedures. 
3.2.1 Background of software fault injection 
The idea of software fault injection is based upon hardware fault injection [CAR99], 
and originated in Mill's fault seeding approach in [MIL72], whereby an estimate of the 
number of faults in a system is made based upon how many injected faults are caught by the 
testing process. This was further improved using stratified fault-seeding [MOR88]. However, 
a number of other approaches have since been developed. 
Fault injection is intended to yield three results: an understanding of the effects of 
real faults, feedback for system correction or enhancement, and a forecast of expected system 
behaviours [CAR99]. One of the major benefits of fault injection i~ its ability to test rare 
events and conditions, which, as discussed above, have been shown' to be the cause of the 
majority of failures within safety-critical systems. [HEC96] states that "The basic premise of 
the rare events approach is that well-tested software does not fa,il under routine input 
conditions, which means that failures must be triggered by unusual input data or computer 
states". Such unusual input data and hardware states can easily be achieved with fault 
injection, and systems can be stress tested with large amounts of unusl:Ial conditions to gamer 
their response. In this way, fault injection also helps to test the exception handling and 
redundancy management capabilities of a system, which are often overlooked by traditional 
testing. 
Fault injection is also used to measure software sensitivity, or tolerance. Sensitivity is 
measured based upon a system's reaction to injections; high sensitivity means that injections 
frequently cause the system to produce undesirable outputs ("undesirable" is defined in either 
the system specification, requirements or defined software hazards [VOA97]). High 
sensitivity implies a lower tolerance for failure, and thus shows a syste:q1 to have a greater risk 
of failure than a low sensitivity system. 
Faults are introduced in one of two ways - either through direct alteration of code, or 
by the perturbation of data flows or control flows to achieve the effects of faults indirectly -
and can be categorized based on when the faults are injected: either during compile-time or 
run-time [HSU97]. 
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When altering program code, faults are typically created by ~ither adding code to the 
code under analysis, changing the code, or deleting code. Code that is added to a program for 
the purpose of either simulating errors or detecting the effects qf those errors is called 
instrumentation code. To perform fault injection, some instrumenta~ion is always necessary, 
and is usually performed by a tool (although it can be added manually). Instrumentation code 
can be placed on top of input or output interfaces to the software, or directly into the logic of 
the software, and can be added to a variety of code formats, such ~s source code, assembly 
code, binary object code, etc. Typical injected faults include mis~timings, delays, missing 
messages, corrupted memory, faulty disk reads, logical errors, syntax errors and perturbation 
of variables. Faults can be injected in many ways and can address program state as well as 
communication and interactions. 
There are two key approaches for instrumentation - code mutation and state 
perturbation. Code mutation [DEM78] occurs at compile-time and involves direct alteration 
of program code, attempting to reproduce potential human errors within code; this typically 
involves changing the syntax of existing code statements or modifying their logic in some 
way - an example of this is shown in figure 4. The main danger with code mutation is that of 
creating an equivalent mutant; this is a mutation that does not affect the output of the code in 
any way (i.e. has no semantic impact on the code base) and is hence meaningless. Mutation 
may also result in transient faults occurring - for example, in figure 4, one of the mutations 
shown ( A = A + A + 2 ; ) will only affect the value of A if A is not zero; this is also 
undesirable, and needs to be guarded against. 
Suppose a program has the following code statement : 
A = A + 2; 
This statement can be mutated as follows : 
A = A + A + 2; 
or it could be mutated to : 
A = A + 20; 
etc. The code could also be deleted. 
Figure 4 - An example of code mutation 
State perturbation [VOA97] has the intention of forcefully modifying program states 
created by the original code, without mutating existing code statements. This is often 
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achieved through the use of code insertion whereby instrumentation code is added to a system 
in the form of function calls that modify internal program values (termed perturbation 
functions), but it can also be implemented by modifying input data' or by the fault injector 
trapping exceptions generated by the system through the use of interrupts. 
Perturbation functions are code instrumentation, and are typically applied to 
programmer-defined variables. They can change either the value of a variable to a value based 
upon the current value, or can change the variable to a value picked at random, independent 
of the original value. They may also return a constant replacement value, if it is suspected that 
any fault placed at that point in the code will result in one particular ,value regardless of what 
the current value is. When non-constant replacement values are used, the perturbation 
functions produce random values based upon the current value and a perturbation 
distribution, with non-constant perturbation distributions including all of the continuous and 
discrete random distributions. 
Figure 5 shows an example of a perturbation function. The function, 
newvalue (int a), randomly either increases a value by 40% or reduces it by 40%. 
Should this increase/decrease not affect the original value in any way, then the function 
returns the original value minus one. This perturbation function is then applied to a variable 
(in this case, an integer variable) in a desired part of the original code. For example, to modify 
the variable a, we simply add 
a= newvalue(a); 
to the original code. 
Additionally,fau/ty input data can be passed into a system at run-time - either by the 
mutation of 'real' data or a false set of data. [VOA98a] suggests that faulty input data is the 
easiest form of fault to simulate correctly (i.e. in a way that reflects real errors that could 
occur naturally). Although state perturbation sometimes requires system code to be re-
compiled, original code is not altered (i.e. instrumentation is added, but original code is not 
mutated) and injections occur at run-time - it can therefore be thought of as run-time based 
I 
fault injection. The advantage of state perturbation is that the problem of equivalent mutants 
does not arrive, and all perturbations should affect system state. 
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Assume a function equilikely (x, y) that randomly returns either x or y. 
int newvalue(int a) 
{ 
} 
int counter = 1; 
int oldvalue = a; 
do 
{ 
} 
a= equilikely (oldvalue * 0.6, oldvalue * 1.4); 
counter ++; 
while ((a== oldvalue) && (counter< 100)); 
if ((counter== 100) && (a== oldvalue)) 
{ 
a = oldvalue - 1; 
} 
return a; 
Figure 5 - An example of a perturbation function 
3.2.2 Differences with traditional testing techniques 
As stated earlier, fault injection complements traditional testing but does not replace 
it. Fault injection cannot be viewed as testing in the traditional sense, as traditional testing 
seeks to determine whether a system meets its stated requirements, and \equires a definition 
of what the correct outputs of the system should be. Fault injection is generally incapable of 
determining correctness, as the act of injecting anomalies into code and/or data results in an 
altered state that may produce incorrect outputs with regard to the system requirements. It is 
therefore impossible to assert that the code itself produces incorrect output, but it can be 
asserted that the modified code produced incorrect output. [VOA98b] states that "The main 
use of software fault injection is in demonstrating what sort of outputs software produces 
under anomalous circumstances." 
Although software engineering practices attempt to predefine system behaviour in the 
event of anomalous conditions, testing invariably only looks at 'reasonable' anomalous 
conditions that are considered possible. Fault injection however, can often offer insight into a 
systems behaviour with the injection of unreasonable, highly unlikely conditions. Should a 
· previously unconsidered anomaly be injected and cause the system to fail, then fault injection 
will have demonstrated that the system is highly sensitive to the problem it was forced to deal 
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with, and the system will need to be analysed in order to ascertain whether any related faults 
also exist. 
3.2.3 Issues to consider 
When considering how to deploy fault injection, two issues need to be addressed. The 
first is that of simulation versus execution. Simulation refers to the development of a model of 
a system, with faults introduced into the model rather than the system itself. This method is 
often slower to test, but easier to change. Execution refers to the process of injecting faults 
into a real system; this is often more useful for analyzing final designs, but is typically more 
difficult to modify afterwards. 
The second issue is that of invasive and non-invasive techniques. A major problem 
with sufficiently complex systems - particularly time dependant ones - is that is may be 
impossible to remove the footprint of the testing mechanism from the behaviour of the 
system, independent of the fault injected. For example, a real-time ,communication protocol 
that would normally meet a deadline for a particular task may miss it because of the extra 
latency induced by the fault injection mechanism. Invasive techniques are those that leave 
behind such a footprint during testing, whilst non-invasive techniques are able to mask their 
presence so as to have no effect on the system other than the faults they inject. 
These factors need to be considered when developing a fault injection strategy for a 
system, in order to gain the most useful results for the budget and type of system used. 
3.3 Applying Fault Injection to Multi-Version Systems 
Given the potential benefits of fault injection, it is surprising that the method has 
mainly been focused on assessment of single version software. [CHE99] states that "as far as 
fault injection for diversity evaluation is concerned, this has not been achieved, and the 
lessons from the literature are limited and of a general nature only". 
The potential is great; by developing an automated system that can inject faults into 
different versions of a multi-version system, test the systems, and then repeat the process with 
another set of injected faults, it should be possible to build up a picture of the relationships 
between different versions with regard to common-mode failures. For a multi-version system, 
there are a total of 
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combinations for fault injection to be applied to, where N is the nur~ber of versions taken rat 
' 
a time. Given that N will usually be a small odd integer, such as 3, 5 :or 7, this should not pose 
I 
a problem. 
For a more detailed analysis, it may also be possible to inj;ect faults into individual 
functions within different versions of a multi-version system, in order to investigate possible 
I 
relationships between disparate channels. For example, consider a 2-version system, each 
version containing 4 functions/procedures (see figure 6). Version 1 contains the set of 
functions {A,B,C,D} whilst version 2 contains the set of functiOJ:?.S {E,F,G,H}. Faults are 
injected in each of the functions in turn, and the systems are analysed for common-mode 
failures following each injection. This is repeated for as many combinations of functions as 
possible. Should it be found that injecting faults (either similar or otherwise) into function A 
of version 1 and function H of version 2 causes a common-mode failure, then the analysis will 
have revealed a potentially unsafe relationship between these functi~ns, even if the functions 
have no obvious connection. "Traditional" testing methods can then be fine-tuned to test these 
functions in more detail. 
Version 1 
Version 2 
Figure 6 - Should faults injected into functions within individual 
versions lead to common-mode failure,' then these 
functions can be seen to have a poten;tially unsafe 
relationship and need to be tested in more de~ail. 
Fault injection can also assess the sensitivicy of each version, on either a system-level 
or a function-level. Should any version or function within a version be highly sensitive, then 
further debugging/testing can be applied, in order to reduce the ~ensitivicy and hopefully 
reduce the likelihood of a failure that could lead to a common-mode failure within the system. 
Furthermore, fault injection provides a very good method fo~ deriving metrics about a 
system, and could therefore help to provide quantitative charactedzations for multi-version 
systems - [VOA95] states that ''fault-injection techniques are 'dynamic, empirical and 
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tractable". Therefore, this approach will help to solve one of the problems highlighted by 
[KIMOO], discussed in section 2.6. 
This research therefore proposes to implement an automated fault injection system, 
designed to assist with the assessment of multi-version systems. This implementation is 
detailed in chapter 4. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter details the problems associated with traditional testing techniques, and 
then goes on to detail the background of fault injection. Different methods of fault injection 
are discussed, and the differences with traditional techniques are examined. A method for 
applying fault injection to multi-version systems is then discussed. 
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Chapter 4 Implementation 
4.1 FITMVS 
The major goal of this research is to develop a non-commercial fault injector that will 
enable an automated fault injection process to be performed on multi-version systems, in 
order to produce valuable metrics, such as sensitivity measures and analysis of potential for 
common-mode failure. This system is called FITMVS (Fault Injection Tool for Multi-
Version Systems). The remainder of this chapter discusses both the design and 
implementation ofFITMVS. 
4.2 The Design of FITMVS 
FITMVS performs data value perturbation, whereby code modifying a particular 
variable's value is added to an existing system's code. Data value perturbation was chosen as 
by using this technique, FITMVS neatly avoids the equivalent mutant problem. This occurs 
when an injection (in the form of code mutation) is made that does not affect the output of the 
code in any way (i.e. has no semantic impact on the code base) and is hence meaningless. 
Instead, all injections made by FITMVS will alter system state in some way- whether trivial 
or otherwise. Data value perturbation also leads to a simpler parsing process, and hence 
allows for quicker development time. 
The basic operation of FITMVS is to parse the code of each channel within a multi-
version system, and then systematically inject faults into each scope within a specified source 
file, compile and execute the code, test the system against a user-created set of tests, log the 
results, revert the code back to its original state, and inject a fault into the next scope within 
the source file. This is continued until the last scope within the source file has had at least one 
injection applied to it. At the conclusion of running FITMVS, a multi-version system will 
therefore have had at least one injection made into each scope within its code, and will have 
been tested for each of these injections. This is explained in more detail in figure 7. The 
process by which this takes place can be split into three stages: system input, the automated 
process, and system output. These three stages are detailed below. 
4.2.1 System input 
User input to the FITMVS system is achieved by way of a menu-driven user 
interface, inside of a standard UNIX terminal window. When the program is initially 
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executed, the U!>er IS shown the mam menu screen. which gives the user the opt1on of starting 
the system 1mmed1ately. editing the system's settings, or ex1t1ng the system. This main menu 
screen ts ~hO\\n m figure 8. 
·---~-----··--------*--------------------- --------------- ---------------------------------. 
' ' 
' ' 
The vers10n'~ JXOCess IS thtn lulled All processes 
wtth the name oftht executable are lermlll8ted 
Results oft he test are recorded to Ill\ output file 
System Wl!lts for etther a fat! mesSilge, l!st compleie 
message or a tlme·OUt (user SJ:eC tfted duration) 
A trst from pre·detemuned set c( tests IS J:etformed ~~------' 
no 
A fault IS Ul)tcled U\lo a copy 
Tht ch&Mel's maktflle IS execuri ..,.., _ ____ -! of the versiOn's ongmal source code 
.. 
S;~em selects an unleslltd muJh.versJOn 
channel At tlus stage no tn)ec I!Ons are made . 
no 
.,. __ ...J 
-------- ...... -...... -------... -· 
~------------------ -----------------------~ 
User Input- soflwale and In;ectton setlln~ 
Source code tested to check for successful comp~lt 
System illput 
' 
Finish 
Figure 7 - FITMVS Operation Flow-Chart 
Automa led process 
t8~~----------------T~e~rm~l~na~l ________________ ~l~gl 
Window fdl t Qptlons Hej!;J 
••••••••••••••••••••• FITMVS ********************* 
Fault Injection Tool for Multi-Version Systems 
MAIN ~ENU 
I) Beg1n FITMVS 
2) Setup Syste• 
3) Exit FITMVS 
Please enter 1-3 to choose an option I 
I l~il==============~~================~~~~~~ 
Figure 8 - FITMVS Main Menu screen 
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Selecting the first optiOn- to start the system immedtatcly - will result in the system 
runnmg '''llh '' hatever defaults have been hard-coded into it, and so th1s is only of real use if 
the u5er '' ould ltkc to start the system with mimmal effort, and has placed their required 
scttmgs mto the FITM\'S source code. 
The system setup menu - shown in figure 9 - allows the user to decide the category 
of scumgs that they des1re to alter, as well as aliO\\ ing them to load prev1ous setlmgs and save 
the current setungs. ··contigure software versions" allows them to configure settings with 
regard to the names and locations of the multi-version system channels that are to be tested, 
whdst ··con figure mjcct10n settings" allows the user to ed1t the way the system goes about its 
automatic task of injecting and testing faults within the software versions. When the user 
loads or saves settings, they are prompted for a filename, which is then used to either save 
settmgs to, or restore settings from. 
~~~----------------~Te=rm='="a~/----------------~18~ 
Window fdlt Qptlons Help I 
1~1••••••••••••••••••••• FITMVS •••••••••••••••~••••• 
SVSTEM SETUP 
1) Configure software vers1ons 
2) Configure injection sett1ngs 
3) load ex1sting setup 
4) Save existing setup 
S) Exit to •ain menu 
Please enter 1-S to choose an option I 
Figure 9 - FITMVS System Setup screen 
The "Configure Software Set1ings" screen. shown in figure 10, displays the name (i.e. 
the name of the executable) of each MVD version that has been entered m to the system. and 
allows users to add vers1ons. remove existing versions or ed1t the version information. When 
a \'ersiOn IS ed1ted or removed, the user is prompted for the number of the version. as 
J1splayed on this screen. When a version is added, the user is prompted for the name of the 
\Crsion. and is then taken to the "Edit Version'' screen, where further details about the version 
can be entered. 
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~~~----------------~Te~rm~l~na~l----------------~1~~ I Window Edi t Qptlons Help I 
••••••••••••••••••••• FITMVS ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Configure Software Versions 
CURRENT NUr~ER OF VERSIONS 
n I Naae of executable 
johnProg 
i ' 1) Add version 
2) Edit version 
3) Remove version 
4) Exit to system setup menu 
Please enter 1-4 to choose an option I 
Figure 10 - FITMVS Configure Software Settings screen 
The "Edtt Vers10n" screen (figure 11) allows the user to modify a number of aspects 
of the MVD versiOn. The executable name of the Yersion can be modt lied, as can the source 
dtrectory of the \'crston (i.e. the directory where the version source code is contained). The 
mvocation command may be set if the version requires a spectal command to execute (for 
example, a batch file may be required, that starts other essential processes for the version to 
successfully execute). 
The "Edit Related Processes" option refers to the names of processes that arc related 
to the MVD versiOn at execution time: when FITMVS kills (terminates) the MVD version (at 
the concluston of each test perfom1ed). all processes listed m the related process list are also 
ktlleu. 
The •·Edtt InJectable Sources" optiOn allows the user to specify the filenames of 
source code that FITt-. fYS "ill mject faults into: selecting this option will take the user to 
another screen (shown m figure 12) and gives the user the option of adding or removing 
filenames from the Its! 
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§] Terminal 
Window fd it Qptlons 
••••••••••••••••••••• FITHVS ••·•••••••••••••••••• 
Edit version 
VerSIOn 1!1 
Na1e of executable: 
Source directory: 
Invocation Co11and: 
johnProg 
/ho•e/jeeves/student2/dcs3p•t/IHPLEH/new511ulation/testbed/john 
start]ohn 
Injectable source files: prodcell.cc 
Other related processes: factory 
1) Change name of executable 
2) Change source directory 
3) Change invocation com1and 
4) Edit injectable source files 
5) Edit related processes 
6) Exit to software versions menu I 
Figure I 1 - FITMVS Edit Version screen 
1 
I 
I 
~~--------------~Te=r=m=ln=al~----------------~~~~ 
Window fdlt Qptlons Help j 
••••••••••••••••••••• FITMVS ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Edit injectable sources 
11 I Path/l~a111e 
I prodcell . <e 
1) Add source 
2) Remove source 
3) Back to edit ve rsion menu I 
jt 
Figure 12 - FITMVS Edit Injectable Sources screen 
A single screen handles all of the injection settings within FITMVS, and is reached 
from the main menu. This screen is detailed in figure 13. The "injections per scope" value sets 
how many times an injection/test cyc le will be performed per scope in each source code file 
listed in the "Injectable Sources'' list. The "minimum scope lines for injection" value refers to 
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the mmtmum number of lines that a scope within the source code must have before an 
inJCCLtest cycle ~~ perfom1cd on it; any scopes with fewer lines than this value are ignored. 
The perturbauon dtstnbutton refers to the maxjmum amount by which a vanable may be 
perturbed when a fault is injected; this number applies to both positive and negative values. 
For example. should the PD be set to 32768 then a perturbation function can be added to 
source code that mcrcases or decreases a variable's value by no more than 32768. 
ft§.L-----------·------~Te~rm~lna~l----------------~18~ 
l r Window Edit Qptlons Help I 
•••~••••••••••••****• FITHVS ********************* 
Configure Injection Settings 
Injections per scope 
Minimum scope lines for injection 
Perturbation distribution 
Using gaussian distribution 
Gaussian standard deviation 
Auto-test filenaMe 
Ti 11e-out de 1 ay 
1) Change inJections per scope 
1 
1 
32768 
No 
8192 
autoTestTest 
15 
2) Change •1n11u1 scope lines for injection 
3) Change perturbation distribution 
q) Change whether us1ng gaussian distribution 
5) Change gaussian standard deviation 
6) Change test f1le na.e 
7) Change tile out delay 
8) Exit to syste1 setup 1enu I 
-
Figure 13 - FITMVS Configure Injection Sett ings screen 
The "change '' hether usmg Gaussian distribution" option all ows the user to specifY 
whether the values by which variables are perturbed follow etther a normal (i.e. every value is 
equally likely) dtstnbution or a Gaussian distribution (for whtch the probability of a number 
bemg ptcked follows a bell-shaped cun·e). The "Gaussian standard deviation" value applies 
onl} when gaussm dtstnbut10n ts being used, and refers to the wtdth of the Gaussian 
distnbuuon cun·e. A Gaussian probability distribution is descnbed as follows: 
f (X) 
( Il x-p )1 ) I - 2 - CI-
----:=== e ' a~ 
J.1 mean 
a = standard devtation 
Thts results m a bcll-shnpcd probability curve with a width based upon the standard 
dc\'latJOn. w1th the probabi lity of a number being selected increasing ns the number becomes 
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clo~er to the mean value. In FITMVS, this mean value is always 0. An example Gaussian 
JtstributtOn 1s shown 111 figure 1-4. 99.9°-'o of all values generated by the Gaussian function will 
fall \\llhm 4 standard dcv1at1ons of the mean, and so FITMVS allows the user to specify a 
standard dev1at1on of up to 25% of the perturbation distribution. For example, should the 
perturbatiOn dtstnbutiOn be set to 32768, then the max1mum allowed Gaussian standard 
lie\ 1atton 1s 8191. Thts ensures that 99.9% of possible values outputted by the function will 
fall berween ... 32768 and -32768. Any that fall outside of this va luc arc rounded to the nearest 
ma\lmum (either postll\ e or negative). This means that the probability curve will have a 
.,mall up-turn on large standard deviations, but this should be negligible. 
i 
-2.0 0.0 2.0 
Figure 14 - A Gaussian probabtlity distribution curve \\ tth a standard dev1at10n of 0.2 
and a mean of 0.0 
The purpose of includmg Gaussian probability distributions 111 FITMVS ts to further 
the scope for stausttcal analysts of data outputted by the system: varying the standard 
dc\'lation wJll force FITMVS to perturb variables by different ranges, and so it may be of 
Interest to see if a relationship between the size of perturbatlons (i.e. the standard deviation) 
und the sensit ivity of a system exists. 
The ''Change test file name'' allows the user to spec1fy the filename of the test file 
that HTMVS reads when testing each MVD version. The "time out delay" value refers to the 
number of seconds that must pass without response during testing from the MVD versiOn 
before FITMVS deterrmnes that a ttme-out has occurred. 
4.2.2 The automated process 
The automated phase of FITMVS is completed w1thout any input from the user. The 
main loop· of th1s process operates b) injecting a fault m to the source code of a version, 
c\eeutmg that \ersJOn·s makefile. and performing the tests listed in the test-set file on this 
\erstOn. Once each test has been performed, the system waits for etther a fail message, test 
complete message or time-our from the version; this resu lt is then logged in a results ti le 
spectlic for that version (either a •·pass'' or a fai l description/number). The version's process is 
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then 'killed' by FITMVS using the standard UNIX kill system call on the version's process 
number, and the testing process continues with the next test in the set. When all tests have 
been completed, the source code of the version is reverted to its original state and a different 
injection is made, and the process is repeated; this is repeated until the specified number of 
injections have been performed for every eligible program scope. 
This 'main' loop is repeated for each version in the multi-version system, with the 
first cycle of the process for each version performed without any injection in order to record 
'baseline' results. 
4.2.3 System outputs 
When all the results for each versiOn have been collected, an analysis can be 
performed based on the log file outputted by FITMVS at the conclusion of each injection 
cycle. This is shown in figure 15. 
Figure 15- The layout of the FITMVS log file 
This consists of the filename of the source file being injected, the number of times an 
injection has been performed on that scope, the number of the test being performed, the 
number of the scope being perturbed, the name of the variable being perturbed, the type of the 
variable (int, float, etc.) being perturbed, the character and line of the source file that the 
perturbation function was injected at, whether or not the test was a pass or a fail (represented 
as 1 or 0 respectively), the message received from the target system following the conclusion 
of a test, the perturbation distribution of the injection, the standard deviation of the Gaussian 
function being used, and the number of seconds that the time out delay is set for. 
4.3 Objectives of the System 
Current tools for the implementation of fault injection in multi-version systems are 
rare, and of the few that exist (such as [VOA97]), all are commercial and thus inaccessible to 
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most researchers in the field; therefore, one of the implicit goals of this research is to make 
such a system available to the general academic community. 
The FITMVS system itself has five objectives. The first objective is to help identify 
areas of code that might lead to common-mode failure -when the automated fault injection. 
process has finished, FITMVS logs can be analyzed and common-mode failures discovered, 
together with the location and type of faults injected to cause them. This will enable the user 
to ascertain which areas of code in each version of the multi-version system- when faulty-
will combine to cause common-mode failure. Subsequent testing can then place a greater 
emphasis on proving the correctness of these areas, in order to minimize the risk of common-
mode failures arising. 
The second objective of FITMVS is to identify any channel of a multi-version system 
that shows a high sensitivity to injected faults; from this analysis, it will be possible to 
identify which MVD versions are most "at risk" in the event of an error occurring, and hence 
perform corrective maintenance on that version. The third objective of FITMVS is related to 
this; namely, by analyzing the number of errors resulting from faults injected into each 
program scope, the sensitivity of each scope will be determined, thus giving developers more 
insight into what areas of code need most attention. Areas of code with high sensitivity 
invariably has a much greater risk of failure than a low-sensitivity area, and so any highly 
sensitive areas revealed by the fault injection process may then be re-examined and changes 
made in order to increase their resilience. 
The fourth objective of FITMVS is to calculate the probability that the complete 
MVD system will fail with a common-mod.e failure, should a fault be injected into each 
version; this metric should help to give much needed empirical data into the relative value of 
MVD systems. The fifth objective of FITMVS is to establish which errors manifest 
themselves most often when a fault is injected into a MVD channel. 
4.4 Limitations of the System 
FITMVS in its initial conception has a number of limitations, although these are largely 
implementational. Initially, the system will only be developed to analyse and inject faults into 
C and C++ source code; however, the actual parser used by the system will be modular, and 
so. further language support will have the potential to be added in future versions. The parser 
itself will be limited, again due to time constraints, and therefore complex mutations will not 
be possible. Initially, the system will be designed to simply add perturbation of data values to 
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code, rather than any form of mutation, although this again will be modular, with the potential 
for code mutation functionality to be added in the future. 
4.5 Portability Issues 
FITMVS is written in ANSI C++ and should therefore be portable to most UNIX and 
Linux systems. However, the shared memory functionality and the mechanism used to kill 
processes mean that some modification will be required for the system to work in alternative 
operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows. Despite this, these changes should not be too 
difficult to make. 
4.6 The Development of FITMVS 
4.6.1 The parser component 
The actual development of the FITMVS sy~tem took place over 6 weeks. The first 
four weeks of this time was dedicated to the creation of a parser capable of parsing C and 
C++ code and producing a parse tree as its output. The parser itself is quite simple, and 
records the name and return type of each variable within each code scope. In addition to this, 
the position in the code of each variable's definition and first assignment are also stored. 
The parse tree is a linked list of type Se opeRe cord. Each ScopeRecord object 
contains information in regard to a program scope - it> start and end position, and the 
number of its parent scope (should it be a nested scope). It also contains two linked lists; one 
of type variableRecord and one of type injectRecord. VariableRecord 
contains data with regard to each variable that exists within the scope - the position of its 
definition, the position of its first assignment, whether or not is assigned within the current 
scopeRecord object, its name and its type. Each variableRecord object is unique to 
each scopeRecord object, and so a variable declared early in the code may be represented 
in multiple variableRecord objects. The inj ectRecord object is used for storing records of 
injections made into each scope in order that no duplicate injections are made; this is not used 
in the initial parsing function of FITMVS. Figure 16 details the make-up of the 
inj ectRecord, variableRecord and scopeRecord objects, and figure 17 shows 
the overall parse tree structure. The parser component of FITMVS was written as a stand-
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alone module, and hence can be used by any application to produce a parse tree like that 
illustrated in figure 17. 
scopeRecord 
- ScopeNumber : int 
+start Character : i nt 
+end Character : int 
+parentScopeUIN : int 
+startline: long 
+endline :long 
+retumType: string 
+van abies In Se ope : I ist <van able R.ec ord > 
+injectionR.ecord : vector<injectRecord> 
variableRecord 
-variable Number : int 
+charDefined : int 
+line Defined :long 
+charAssigned : int 
+lineAssigned :long 
+isAssigned : bool 
+isFunctionVariable : bool 
+valiableName :string 
+variable Type: string 
injectRecord 
+operand: char 
+variable :string 
+value: double 
Figure 16 - The scopeRecord, variableRecord and inj ectRecord objects 
injectRecon:l 
injectRecon:l • 
injectRecon:l 
injectRecon:J • 
Figure 17 - The structure of the parse tree generated by the parser component of FITMVS 
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The performance of the parser module is satisfactory, especially when considering 
that the parser is only used once for every channel in the MVD system. In order to provide a 
rough guide to the exact performance of the parser, an automated test was created, whereby a 
1000 line program was parsed, and then appended to itself (to form a 2000 line program) and 
re-parsed. This cycle was continued until the program had reached I 00,000 lines in size, with 
the amount of time to parse being recorded in each cycle. The result of these tests is shown in 
figure 18. 
Execution Times for FITMVS Parser Component 
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Figure 18 - Parse Times for different sized programs 
As can be seen, the relationship between time taken to parse and the size of the target 
program was linear; thjs was expected, as the parser was essentially parsing the same 
additional code on each test. The main purpose of the test was to determine whether the 
structure of the parse tree or the amount of data being placed on the system stack would cause 
parse times for realistic-sized programs to be adversely affected. Fortunately, this does not 
appear to be the case. 
4.6.2 Auto-testing functionaJity 
After the parser component was completed, the auto-testing functionality of FITMVS 
was implemented. This consisted of the shared memory mechanisms, functionality to decode 
and send test messages from a specified test file, mechanisms for checking if a process has 
timed-out, and mechanisms for process termination. 
The GNU shared memory libraries were used to create two classes 
shared.MemoryClient and shared.MemoryServer. These classes are designed to 
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provide a simple interface between the FITMVS system (using sharedMemoryServer) 
and the target MVD system (using sharedMemoryClient). The mechanism for 
determining whether or not a time-out has occurred simply uses these shared memory objects 
to check whether the target (MVD) system has Written to the shared memory space. If such a 
write does not occur within an amount of time specified by the user, the process temiination 
mechanisms are enforced. These work by simply redirecting the output of the standard UNIX 
ps tool through a grep statement designed to filter out all processes that are not related to 
the process requiring termination. The output from this is then re-directed to a file, from 
which process numbers are extracted and terminated using a kill -9 command. Overall, 
this stage of development took approximately 1 week of time. 
4.6.3 The main fault injector and user interface components 
With the completion of the parser and auto-testing routines, the development of the 
main fault injector component ofFITMVS was relatively simple, and only required 3 days of 
development time. The injector's main duty is to analyze the parse tree for each program 
scope and calculate whether an injection should be performed; if so, then a variable stored 
within that scopes variable list is selected at random, and a perturbation function is placed 
within the program code at the either the start of that particular scope, or immediately after 
the variable is first assigned within the scope (if applicable). 
The final major development process was the creation of the user interface. Due to 
time constraints, a graphical user interface was not pursued; indeed, it would be unwise to 
spend valuable time on such a display when the FITMVS system is still in a proof-of-concept 
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stage. Instead, the user-interface consists of a series of text-based menus, and input from the 
user is entirely keyboard-based. The user interface routines were required to be portable 
between UNIX platforms and terminal types, and therefore some re-writing of standard C 
functions such as kbhi t ( ) was required; however, despite this, the user interface modules 
took only 3 days of development time to complete. 
4.6.4 Changes required to the target system 
Before FITMVS can be used, a number of preparations must be made in regard to the 
target system (i.e. the multi-version system to be tested), in order for the automated process to 
function correctly. A standard header file containing the shared.MemoryClient object 
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must be included in the MVD system code in order for the system to be able to communicate 
through shared memory to FITMVS. 
This header file also contains the functions FITMVS_pass (), 
FITMVS_fail (string) and FITMVS_confirm ().These functions will send a 'test 
passed' message, a 'test failure' message (with a failure description), and a message 
confirming that the current data in the shared memory space has been received, respectively. 
It is through this use of shared memory that FITMVS will be able to record the results of tests 
performed. The only exception to this is if a version does not report a result within a given 
amount of time; should this occur, FITMVS will terminate the target systems process and 
record a TIMEOUT message. A FITMVS_getMessage () function is present, and 
automatically reads the shared memory and returns the contents as a string to the MVD 
system. 
A FITMVS _reset () function is also present and will also have to be added to each 
target system. This function may involve significant changes between different software 
systems. Essentially, the goal of the function is to reset the state of the target system back to 
its initial state; should this prove difficult to do, then the function should send a 
KILL_ SYSTEM message to the fault injector in order for the target system's process to be 
terminated and re-started. 
An aim of FITMVS is to make the process of adapting an existing system in the way 
described above as easy as possible; this is why most of the function calls needed are pre-
written and available in a header file which can then be inserted into the target system's code. 
Where necessary, the user will then be able to modify the pre-written functions in order to 
best represent the target system. 
4.6.5 The test-set file makeup 
The process of parsing and applying the data values specified by the test-set file is left 
to the user to implement, with a partially written function included in the standard FITMVS 
header file that all target systems will need to include. Each line of the test-set file constitutes 
a test; this takes the form of the name of the test data, followed by the values appropriate for 
this data, separated by commas and enclosed within brackets. Each data element is delimited 
with a semi-colon. The form of the test file therefore resembles: 
VariableName (value, value, ... ) ;VariableName (value,value, ... ); etc. 
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Once the target system has parsed this data and entered it appropriately, a 
TEST_RECEIVED message is sent to FITMVS and the test is considered to have started, 
with FITMVS waiting for the test result to be transmitted through shared memory. Should no 
response come within a specified time-out period, then the target system will be considered to 
have timed-out. 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter introduces the Fault Injection Tool for Multi-Version Systems 
(FITMVS). It goes on to detail the design and operation of FITMVS, the objectives of the 
system, the limitations of the system, and portability issues. The actual development of each 
major component of FITMVS is then discussed. The changes that need to be made to target 
systems are detailed, and the chapter concludes by describing the make-up of the test files 
used by FITMVS. 
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Chapter 5 Application Case Study 
5.1 Factory Production Cell Case Study 
In addition to the development of FITMVS, it is also necessary to select an 
appropriate MVD application to test. Because of the large implementation time required to 
develop the FITMVS system, it is prudent to select an existing MVD system for which source 
code is available. It is also desirable for the application to be a real-time system, as real-time 
systems invariably involve high reliability and safety requirements. To this end, a system 
previously researched by the author [TOWOla, TOWOlb] was chosen. 
The application is the controller system for a simulation of a flexible factory 
production cell (figure 19). The production-cell consists of two conveyor belts, one of which 
delivers the raw units (blanks) into the system, and one of which moves the blanks out of the 
system once they have been fully processed. The unit also consists of four separate 
workstations, each of which has its own number; depending on the type of the workstation, it 
can either be switched on and off by the controller software, or is permanently on. Two 
cranes, mounted on a racking which prevent them from both being in the same X position at 
the same time are used to transport blanks around the system. Each blank has its own bar-
code, which identifies which workstations it needs to be placed in, and the minimum and 
maximum amounts of time that it can spend within each workstation. Blanks can be processed 
either in a specific order, or in any order, depending on the instructions in the bar-code. 
The controller software is required to allow the production-cell simulation to process 
up to two blanks (units) at any one time, whilst ensuring that the blanks are processed 
correctly within the appropriate time constraints. It is also necessary to ensure that the system 
remains safe. For example, it is imperative to ensure that the two cranes never collide with 
each other, and that no blank is placed in a workstation that already contains a blank. Further 
safety requirements include both cranes being returned to safety positions whenever they are 
not in use, and ensuring that blanks are not left in workstations for longer than their maximum 
stipulated time. Also, the feed belt needs to be controlled by the software in order to ensure 
that no more than two blanks enter the system at any given time, and that none fall off the end 
of the belt. 
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Barcode Sensor Crane Rack Processing Units 
Feed Belt 
Figure 19 -Diagram of Flexible Production Cell 
5.2 System Requirements 
The MVD system compnses of three separate channels, two of which are developed 
in C++, and one of which is developed in Java. Each channel of the MVD controlled system 
was developed independently, to a rigorous specitication document in order to ensure that the 
diverse channels followed the same rules and procedures in given scenarios, and with 
min1mum contact between programmers. Although the specification document was rigorous, 
at the same time it was important to ensure that the system specification is not over-specified: 
therefore. the specification stated functional requirements clearly and unambiguously, whi lst 
leaving the widest possible choice of implementations. Over-specification at the requirements 
stage has been a criticism of several past experiments [AVI89], as the reduced levels of 
diversity increase the probability of correlated faults. and hence reduce the overall 
dependability of the resulting multi-version system. 
The system requires real-time processing, and is safety-critical. and therefore requires 
an extremely high level of dependability. As many experiments have found that correlated 
faults can drastically reduce the overall dependability of a multi-version system - e.g. 
[KNI86. ECK9l]- a conscious decision was made to make the development of each channel 
as diverse as possible. 
5.2.1 Assumptions 
Within the requirements document, a number of assumptions are made about the 
working environment of the controller software and simulation. These are listed in figure 20. 
50 
# Assu~tion 
1 The system has no more than one feed belt and one deposit belt. 
2 There ts no set value or limit for the number of items passing through the system. 
3 There are only two types of workstation as described in the task descriplton document. 
4 The setup has only two possible configurations; those of one crane and two workstations, and of two 
cranes and four workstattons. 
5 Each item has a mmimum and a maximum time that it can spend in each works talion 
6 Items may have a max1mum amount of lime in which th~ can be 1n the s_y_stem for. 
7 The maximum hme that a blank may spend inside a system may not be less than the total minimum lime that it must spend 1n each of the workstations. 
8 Each workstahon can only process a blank once before it1s removed from the ~stem. 
9 A blank may only be placed on the deposit bell if no blank is detected there. 
10 The deposit bell is not controlled by the control program. 
11 The gnpper has only two vertical positions. 11 can only retrieve blanks while in the lower posttion, and it 
can only move honzontany Without colliding with workstations and belts while in the ~erpos1tion. 
12 If a blank has a set order of processing, the ~stem must process the blank in that order. 
13 The cranes must never be at the same X position. 
14 The cranes may not move unless the gripper is In the upper_B9sition. 
15 A blank may only be placed in a works1ation if the sensor reports that it is free. 
16 The magnet may only be enabled or disabled while In its lower position. 
17 The magnet may not be disabled while carrying a blank unless the gripper Is both in its lower position 
and above etther a belt or a workstation. 
18 The feed belt must be turned off 1f the end-belt sensor reports a blank. 
19 Every blank passmg through the ~stem has a bar code, and all bar codes are correct. 
20 All blanks are set a dtstance apart so the system can distmguish between separate blanks 
21 Every blank tntroduced to the system by the feed bell or present in the system at the start of opera tion 
must also leave the system via the output belt. 
Figure 20 - AssumptiOns made regarding the controller soft,, arc's worktng environment 
5.2.2 Operational em·ironment 
The production-cell stmulation is implemented in Java, and can be run on a number 
of dtlTcrcnt operating systems (although it is primarily designed for use on UNfX systems). 
The controller software did not require any graphical output, and so none of the platforms 
used for the development of the software were required to produce graphical output. The 
controller software tlself 1s used only to produce output tiles for use by the production-cell 
S1mulat10n; therefore there is no minimum speed requirement on any system using the 
conrroller software. 
5.2.3 External interfaces & data flo·n 
rhe productton-cell Simulation and the controller software commumcate via a first-in-
first-out ptpc mechanism. with communications bemg sent as ASCII text. For example, a 
message to the production-cell Sllnulation consists of a header, the message body and a 
termmator. The header consists of an open squared bracket - f - followed by a linefeed. The 
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tennmator conststs of a closing square bracket - ]. Figure 21 demonstrates the format of 
messages bodtcs. 
Message Description 
PortaiXn p Move ctane n to horizontal position p. 
PortaiYn p Move ctane n to vertical position p. 
MagnetOnn Switch on the magnet on the crane n. 
MagnetOffn Switch off the magnet on the crane n. 
PortaiDownn Move ctane n lo the down position. 
PortaiUpn Move crane n to the up position. 
FeedBeltOn Switch on the feedbelt. 
FeedBeltOff Switch off the feedbelt. 
CodeSensorOn Activate the code sensor. 
WorkStationOnn Switch on workstation n. This command is ignored by type 2 devices. 
GetState Requests the production-cell simulation to return the current s tate. 
Figure 21 - Simulation inputs 
5.2A Logging format 
fhe conrroller software is required to log its activity m a file. fhese opttons (and the 
loggmg tile name) are spectfied as a conunand lme argument. fhe loggmg file is designed to 
be used to compare results between different controller versions, and to see where errors have 
been made. 
A log entry ts made for every program cycle where mfonnatton is received from the 
stmulator, or when a dectsion was made. Accordingly, the log records all information 
received from the simulation and the results of any decisions made by the controller. Figure 
22 shows the format of the log data for each program cycle. 
Item Conditional Description 
[ No Start of log 1tem 
lime No Time in milliseconds since the start of the 
controller. 
<STATUS> Yes Start of status 
status Yes The unformatted feedback from 'GetState' 
</STATUS> Yes End of status 
[OUT PUn Yes Start of output sectiOn 
controller output Yes Output of controller: exactly the same as the output g1ven to the production-cell simulation. 
IJOUTPUTI Yes End of output section 
J No End of log 1tem 
Figure 22 - Fonnat of controller log 
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5.2.5 General crane operation 
1t I!> necessary to make assumptions regardmg crane operation within the factory 
productiOn cell. These are listed in figure 23. 
# Assumption 
1 The two cranes can move simultaneously 
2 When a crane has no job to perform, it will move back to the safety posihon 
3 The safety position is defined as X1. Y2 for crane 1 and X8. Y2 for crane 2 
4 Crane 1 w1ll deal with workstations 1 and 2 
5 Crane 2 will deal with workstations 3 and 4 
Figure 23 - Assumptions made about the cranes 
If the mo\ement of a crane results in 1t collidmg with the other crane, then it is 
requtred to mo,·e bad. to the appropriate safety posttion defined m figure 23. until the other 
crane 1s m a pos1t1on \\ h1ch "tll not result in collision. 
5.2.6 l\lovement of blanks 
When a smgle blank enters the system, the controller is simply required to process the 
blank m the order sttpulated by its bar-code, within specific time limits. If there are two 
blanks 111 the system then one of five scenarios described in figure 24 will occur. 
# Scenario 
1 Both blanks needed to be transported to the deposit belt. 
2 Both blanks needed to be moved to other workstations. 
3 One blank needed to be moved to the deposit belt, the other to another 
works talion 
4 Only one blank needed to be moved to another production cell or the deposit belt 
5 N61ther needed to be moved. 
Figure 24 - Scenanos ''hen there are t'' o blanks m the system 
5.2. 7 Botb blanks need to be moved to the deposit belt 
If both blanks need to be moved to the deposit belt, then crane one wil l move to its 
safety position, whilst crane two collects the blank with the lowest maximum processing 
ttme(max,) and moves tt to the deposit belt. Crane two wi ll then repeat the process with the 
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other blank. If both blanks possess the same max; then the blank that is in the station with the 
lowest ID number wili be moved first. 
5.2.8 Both blanks need to be moved to other workstations 
When blanks are on opposite sides of the production ceii and need to be moved to the 
opposite workstation, it is specified that the foilowing should be done; crane 1 will pick up 
the blank in station 1 or 2, and crane 2 will pick up the blank in station 3 or 4. Both cranes are 
Figure 25 - example 
situation of blanks on 
opposite side of the 
production-cell 
then moved to their target stations and will both then deposit 
their blanks. This is shown in figure 25. 
There are several possibilities for the movement of 
blanks in this scenario, and the requirements document 
specifies the procedure to foilow for every combination of 
workstations, in order to make sure the different versions wili 
make the same decisions. 
5.2.9 One blank needs to be moved to deposit belt, the other to another 
workstation 
In this case crane 1 wili return to its safety position and crane 2 will move to pick up 
the blank which needs to be removed from the system. Crane one will then move and deposit 
the remaining blank in the desired station; crane 2 will then move its blank to the deposit belt. 
5.2.1 0 Only one blank needs to be moved to another workstation or the deposit 
belt. 
In this case, the controiier wili move the relevant blank to its target destination as if it 
is the only blank within the system; should its target destination be unavailable, the relevant 
crane will pick up the blank and move to its safety position until the target destination 
becomes free; it wili then deposit the blank appropriately. 
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5.2.11 Neither needs to be moved 
If ne1ther blank needs to be moved, the controller software will perfom1 no action. 
5.2.1 2 Belt Control 
The feed and depos1t belts within the system also need to have their behaviour 
specified. F1gurc 26 lists the assumptions that are made about them. 
11 Assumption 
1 The feed belt is Initialised to be off. 
2 The feed belt should be switched off immediately after the feed belt sensor is activated. 
3 At the same time that the feed belt is switched off, the code sensor should be activated. 
4 Once a blank has been lifted from the feed belt (crane is in upper position). the feed belt should be started in 
order to move the next blanK up to the code sensor. 
5 The depos1t bel t is controlled separately and will always be running. 
6 A blanK may only be placed on the deposit belt if the deposit belt lnd1cator shows that another blank is not 
already there 
If the above Situation occurs. the crane should stay in the upper position at the deposit belt place until the 
7 sensor has ind1cated that the belt is free The blank should then be immedtately lowered and then immediately 
released 
Figure 26 - Assumptions about the feed belt and deposit belt 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter describes in detai l the factory production cell simulation that is to be 
used to test the effectiveness of the FITMVS system; and describes the system req uirements, 
operational details. and assumptions made by the production cell simulation. 
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Chapter 6 The Experiment Performed 
6.1 Overvie'Y of the Experiment Performed 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the FITMVS system, it is necessary to apply 
FITMVS to an existing MVD system; the system chosen is that of the factory production cell 
discussed in chapter 5. One of the current limitations of FITMVS is that it is only able to 
partially parse Java source code, and so the two MVD channels written in C++ were used to 
form a 2-version system for purposes of this experiment. 
This experiment seeks to use the FITMVS system to perform injections on each 
program scope in both channels; following each injection, FITMVS will automatically 
compile the perturbed channel and test it against a set of tests specified below. One complete 
run of injections through a target channel is referred to as an "injection cycle". Altogether, a 
total of ·25 injections cycles are applied to each channel during the experiment, with 5 
injection cycles being performed for Gaussian distributions with standard deviations of 8192, 
4096, 2048, and 1, as well as for a normal distribution. All tests will be performed with the 
perturbation distribution set to 32768. At the end of each injection cycle, the resultant log files 
produced by FITMVS are saved and analyzed; these list every single injection and test 
performed, together with the results of the test. From analysis of these log files, a picture of 
overall sensitivity to fault is created for each channel. 
6.2 Re-development of the Factory Simulation 
The major difficulty with testing the factory controller system with FITMVS is that 
the actual simulation itself is written in Java, and is both slow, unstable, and difficult to adapt 
to automatic testing (i.e. automatic entry of test data). In order to maximize the number of 
tests that could be performed on the system, it was decided that the entire simulation must be 
re-written. It should be noted that this in no way affects the MVD controller system - merely 
the simulation that it controls. 
The simulation was therefore re-written entirely in C++. The new simulation includes 
all shared memory libraries and routines necessary for communication with FITMVS, as well 
as allowing for test data to be entered automatically. In addition, the new system executes 
many times faster than the original Java version; unfortunately, due to the real-time nature of 
the simulation, the MVD controller channels often process blanks whilst measuring 
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processing time based on the hardware timer, and so the ·time_ taken per test is only reduced by 
approximately 83%, from an average test time of 60 seconds to an average test time of 
approximately 10 seconds (although this depends on the actual minimum processing time 
values set for each blank). It was not possible to increase the interrupt rate (i.e. speed) of the 
hardware timer, as the SP ARCstations used to test FITMVS are multi-user machines. 
6.3 Test Data 
As previously discussed, the MVD channels perform processing based upon the 
hardware timer, arid so each test performed requires several seconds to execute. Although 
time values can be set to 0 seconds, it is desirable to retain minimum and maximum deadlines 
within the test data as the temporal domain is very important when considering real-time 
systems, and it is of interest to see if temporal faults are triggered during the injection testing. 
Due to the number of injection-cycles that are to be performed, the number of tests per 
injection have to be kept to a minimum otherwise the amount of time required to perform the 
tests will be too great. 
With this in mind, a total of 5 tests are used. These are chosen to cover as broad a 
range of situations are can be expected with such a small test set. The setup of the tests is as 
follows: 
6.3.1 Test 1 (single blank) 
Maximum Time in System for blank 1 (ms): 9000 
Blank 1 - preserved order 
Workstation 1 2 3 4 
Min (ms) 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 3000 3000 3000 
6.3.2 Test 2 (single blank) 
Maximum Time in System for blank 1 (ms): 10000 
Blank 1 - non-preserved order 
Workstation 2 3 1 4 
Min (ms) 2000 1000 2000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 2000 4000 3000 
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6.3.3 Test 3 (two blanks) 
Maximum Time in System for blank 1 (ms): 7000 
Maximum Time in System for blank 2 (ms): 9000 
Blank 1 - non-preserved order 
Workstation 1 3 4 2 
Min (ms) 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 3000 3000 3000 
Blank 2 - non-preserved order 
Workstation 2 1 3 4 
Min (ms) 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 3000 3000 3000 
6.3.4 Test 4 (two blanks) 
Maximum Time in System for blank 1 (ms): 9000 
Maximum Time in System for blank 2 (ms): 10000 
Blank 1 - preserved order 
Workstation 1 4 2 3 
Min (ms) 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 3000 3000 3000 
Blank 2 - non-preserved order 
Workstation 4 3 2 1 
Min (ms) 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 3000 3000 3000 
6.3.5 Test 5 (two blanks) 
Maximum Time in System for blank 1 (ms): 7000 
Maximum Time in System for blank 2'(ms): 10000 
Blank 1 - non-preserved order 
Workstation 3 2 4 1 
Min (ms) 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 3000 3000 3000 
Blank 2 - non-preserved order 
Workstation 1 4 2 3 
Min (ms) 1000 10.00 1000 1000 
Max (ms) 3000 3000 3000 3000 
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The actual contents of the test file used to set up these tests is shown in figure 27. 
BLANK(l,l, 3, 4,1000,1000,1000,1000,3000,3000,3000,3000, t, 9000) 
BLANK (2, 3, 1, 4.. 2000 I 1000, 2000, 1000, 3000, 2000, 4000, 3000, f, 10000) 
BLANK (1, 3. {. 2,1000, 1000, 1000 I 1000, 3000 I 3000 I 3000, 3000 If, 7000); BLANK (2, 1, 3, 4, 1000, 1000. 1000, 1000, 3000 I 3 000, 3000, 3 000, f, 9000) 
BLANK (1, 4, 2, 3. 1000. 2000' 1000. 2000, 3000, 3000.2000 I 3000, t, 9000) ; BLANK ( 4, 3, 2 I 1, 3000, 1000, 2000, 2000, 3000 I 3 000, 4000, 3 000 I£, 10000 l 
BLANK. (3, 2, 4. 1, 1000, 1000, 1000, 2000, 3000, 2000, 2000 I 4000, f, 7000); BLANK (1, 4, 2 I 3 I 1000, 1000, 3000, 2000, 3000 I 4000, 5000. 4000 I£, 10000) 
Figure 27 - Contents of the test file used to test the MVD fa~tory system 
6.4 Processing Time 
Due to the large amount of time expected for the completion of each injection cycle, 
it is desirable to speed up the testing of the MVD system by executing FITMVS on multiple 
machines simultaneously. Therefore, a total of 14 different SPARC workstations will be used 
for testing; FITMVS will run on each system simultaneously (running an identical copy of the 
MVD channel software). When an injection cycle on a machine finishes, another can be 
started on the machine if necessary. 
Output from FITMVS is in the form of a log file, which can be directly imported into 
a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet can then be used to analyse the results of 
each injection cycle, and should allow for relatively quick analysis. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter gives an overview of the experiment performed using the FITMVS 
system. It details the re-development of the factory simulation in C++, and describes the test 
data used during the experiment. The chapter concludes by describing the extra hardware used 
to combat the large amount of processing time required for each test. 
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Chapter 7 Results and Analysis 
7.1 Overview of Results 
The experiment was performed over a period of one week. At the conclusion of the 
experiment, a total of 21,211 tests were performed; this is in contrast with the 4,320 tests 
performed manually on the MVD system in [TOW01a, TOW01b]- an increase of more than 
490%. This was in large part due to the automatic testing mechanisms that were put into 
place. Each complete run of FITMVS took approximately 2 hours on Channel A of the MVD 
system, and 4 hours on Channel B of the MVD system, and the overall amount of processing 
time was approximately 150 hours, equating to 6 and a half days of continuous processing 
(although it must be remembered that much of this processing was done across multiple 
SPARC workstations). 
The difference in processing time between the two MVD channels is explained due to 
the fact that Channel B has a greater number of code scopes than Channel A (131 scopes as 
opposed to 73), and so a larger number of injections and subsequent tests were performed on 
Channel B. 
7.2 Output ofFITMVS Log Files 
The amount of data produced by FITMVS was very pleasing, with a total of more 
than 875 pages of Microsoft Excel-readable logs produced from the 25 injection-cycles 
performed on both channels. As described in chapter 4, each line of these log files states the 
source filename of the injected code, the number of the injection, the test number, the scope 
number, the name of the variable perturbed, the type of the perturbed variable, the character 
and line number within the source file where the perturbation function was placed, the 
injection string itself, whether or not the test was successful (1 indicates success, 0 indicates 
failure), the test result message, the perturbation distribution, the standard deviation of the 
gaussian distribution and the time-out interval of the test. Due to size considerations, not even 
a single log file can be produced in its entirety; however, figure 28 and figure 29 show an 
example of the data collected. 
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Thu Aug 16 14:32:08 BST2001 
Minimum lines for injectable scope: 
Time-out delay: 15 
Gaussian distribution: Yes 
Perturbation distribution: 32768 
Standard Deviation: 8192 
components .cpp 1 1 1 t long 
components .cpp 1 2 1 t long 
components.cpp 1 3 1 t long 
components .cpp 1 4 1 t long 
components .cpp 1 5 1 t long 
components .cpp 1 1 2 yPos int 
components .cpp 1 2 2 yPos int 
components.cpp 1 3 2 yPos int 
components .c pp 1 4 2 yPos int 
components .cpp 1 5 2 yPos int 
components .cpp 1 1 3 yPos int 
components .cpp 1 2 3 yPos int 
components .cpp 1 3 3 yPos int 
components.cpp 1 4 3 yPos int 
components .cpp 1 5 3 yPos int 
components.cpp 1 1 13 remp int 
components .cpp 1 2 13 remp int 
components .cpp 1 3 13 remp int 
components .cpp 1 4 13 remp int 
components .cpp 1 5 13 remp int 
components .cpp 1 1 14 des1ination int 
components.cpp 1 2 14 des1ination int 
components .cpp 1 3 14 des1ination int 
components .cpp 1 4 14 des1ination int 
components .cpp 1 5 14 des1ination int 
components .cpp 1 1 15 wornTmp int 
components .cpp 1 2 15 wornTmp int 
components.cpp 1 3 15 wornTmp int 
components.cpp 1 4 15 wornTmp int 
components .cpp 1 5 15 wornTmp int 
components .cpp 1 1 17 des1ination int 
components .cpp 1 2 17 des1ination int 
components .cpp 1 3 17 des1ination int 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
17 t = t + 7152; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
17 t = t + 7152; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
17 t = t + 7152; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
17 t = t + 7152; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
~ 
'V 
~ 
17 t=t+7152; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 § 
37 yPos = yPos + 8234; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank - Factory: :checkCraneMagnetsl) 32768 8192 15 ..c u 
37 yPos = yPos + 8234; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 H 
37 yPos = yPos + 8234; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank - Factory: :checkCraneMagnetsl) 32768 8192 15 <-8 
37 yPos = yPos + 8234; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank - Factory: :checkCraneMagnetsl) 32768 8192 15 ...... ;:l 
37 yPos = yPos + 8234; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank - Factory: :checkCraneMagnets() 32768 8192 15 & ;:l 
37 yPos = yPos + 9713; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank . Factory: :checkCraneMagnetsl) 32768 8192 15 0 
37 yPos = yPos + 9713; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 
37 yPos = yPos + 9713; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank · Factory: :checkCraneMagnets() 32768 8192 15 
37 yPos = yPos + 9713; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank . Factory: :checkCraneMagnets() 32768 8192 15 
VJ 
> ~ ....... 
b 1.0 
37 yPos = yPos + 9713; 0 Test failed: Crane one dropped blank . Factory::checkCraneMagnets() 32768 8192 15 ~ 
145 remp = remp + -6420; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 4-< 0 
145 remp = remp + -6420; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 ...... (.) 
145 remp = remp + -6420; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 ro 
.tl 
145 remp = remp + -6420; 0 Test failed: l1Uor1dation 1 - blank exceeded time limit. Factory: :checkl1Uorbta1ions() 32768 8192 15 X I:.I-1 
145 remp = remp + -6420; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 
149 des1ination = des1ination + 7274; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 00 
149 des1ination = des1ination + 727 4; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 N 
149 des1ination = des1ination + 7274; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 ~ 
'"' 149 des1ination = des1ination + 7274; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 = eJ) 
.... 
149 des1ination = des1ination + 7274; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 ~ 
155 wornTmp = wornTmp + -446; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
155 wornTmp = wornTmp + -446; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
155 wornTmp = wornTmp + -446; 0 Test failed: liUornstation 2 - blank exceeded time limit. Factory::checkliUornstations() 32768 8192 15 
155 wornTmp = wornTmp + -446; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
155 wornTmp = wornTmp + -446; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 
161 des1ination = des1ination + -982; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
161 des1ination = des1ination + -982; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
161 des1ination = des1ination + -982; 0 Test failed: liUornstation 1 • blank exceeded time limit. Factory::checkliUornstations() 32768 8192 15 
Thu Aug 16 18:24:28 BST 2001 
Minimum lines for injectable scope: 
Time-out delay: 15 
Gaussian distribution: Yes 
Perturbation distribution: 32768 
Standard Deviation: 8192 
prodcell.cc 1 1 2 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 2 2 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 3 2 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 4 2 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 5 2 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 1 31m2 boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 2 31m2 boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 3 31m2 boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 4 31m2 bool 
prodcell.cc 1 5 31m2 boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 1 4 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 2 4 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 3 4 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 4 4 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 5 4 command slring 
prodcell.cc 1 1 5 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 2 5 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 3 5 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 4 5 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 5 5 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 1 6 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 2 6 end boo I 
prodcell.cc 1 3 6 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 4 6 end bool 
prodcell.cc 1 5 6 end boo/ 
prodcell.cc 1 1 7 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 2 7 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 3 7 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 4 7 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 5 7 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 1 8 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 2 8 command Wing 
prodcell.cc 1 3 8 command Wing 
37 
37 
37 
37 
37 
33 
33 
33 
33 
33 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
28 command= command+ 18307; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
28 command = command + 18307; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
28 command= command+ 18307; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
28 command= command+ 18307; 1 rest passed 32768 8192 15 
28 command= command+ 18307; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
p:) 
~ § 
c::l 
73 1m2= false; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 .I:: u 
73 1m2= false; 0 Time out 32768 8192 15 1-; 
73 1m2= false; 0 Test failed: Crane tlfllo dropped blank Factory: :checkCraneMagnels() 32768 8192 15 c8 
73 1m2= false; 0 Test failed: Cranetlfllo dropped blank Factory :checkCraneMagnels() 32768 8192 15 
73 1m2= false; 0 Test failed: Crane tlfllo dropped blank Factory :checkCraneMagnels() 32768 8192 15 
..... 
::l 
.& 
::l 
36 command = command + -1924; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 0 
36 command= command+ -1924; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
36 command = command + -1924; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
36 command= command+ -1924; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
Cl) 
> ~ N 
-
\0 
36 command = command + -1924; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 ~ 
41 end= false; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
<.,..... 
0 
41 end =false; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 ...... u 
41 end =false; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 c::l 
.)::::: 
41 end =false; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 ~ ~ 
41 end =false; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
46 end = lrue; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 Q\ 
46 end = lrue; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 N 
46 end = lnle; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
~ 
I. 
46 end = lrue; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 = eJ) 
46 end = lnle; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 ~ 
52 command= command+ -7551; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
52 command = command + -7551; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
52 command = command + -7551; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
52 command = command + -7551; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
52 command = command + -7551; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
58 command = command + 5533; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
58 command = command + 5533; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
58 command • command + 5533; 1 Test passed 32768 8192 15 
7.3 Sensitivity Metrics 
Despite the large quantity of raw results, it is possible to derive a large number of 
different metrics and analyses. One of these metrics is that of sensitivity; this is the percentage 
probability that a channel will fail to successfully pass a test after a fault is injected into it. For 
example, in one injection cycle, 295 tests were performed on Channel A, of which 45 resulted 
in either a failure or a timeout. Therefore, the sensitivity of the channel to a fault in that 
particular injection cycle is (100 I 295) x 45 = 15.25424%. 
This calculation is performed for each injection cycle performed on both channels; 
these results are shown in figure 30. Each row represents a complete injection-cycle; 
"procName" refers to the name of the channel, "PD" refers to the perturbation distribution, 
"G-SD" refers to the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution (if applicable), and 
"Sensitivity" is the percentage chance of a test failing as a result of a fault being added. The 
final two columns in each table refer to the standard deviation of the sensitivity values (not to 
be confused with the Gaussian distribution's standard deviation) and the average sensitivity 
for each set of 5 injection-cycles respectively. 
As can be seen, there is a clear distinction (i.e. no overlap) between the average 
sensitivity values of the two channels; channel A has a sensitivity of approximately 20%, 
whilst channel B has a sensitivity of approximately 14.5%. The standard deviation of the 
sensitivity results for both channels is small, with channel A having a standard deviation of 
1.3 and channel B of 0.3; it can therefore be seen that both channel's sensitivity values are 
relatively accurate. These sensitivity measures fit in well with what is already know about the 
dependability of the two channels as a result of previous studies [TOWOla, TOW01b]; 
namely, that channel A is error-prone (failing in approximately 25% of all possible 
situations), whilst channel B is far more dependable (failing on approximately 1.5% of all 
possible situations). 
However, there appears to be no pattern amongst the sensitivity results for individual 
injection cycles performed within the channels themselves. Although tests using Gaussian 
distributions with different standard deviations were performed, it can be seen that for this 
application, the differences in sensitivity for each set of tests are very similar and clearly 
overlap when the standard deviations of the results are taken into account. It therefore appears 
to be the case that either the different distributions have no bearing on the sensitivity of the 
MVD system tested, or the number of tests performed is not great enough to establish the 
resolution necessary for identifying a possible relationship. Diagrams showing the average 
sensitivity for each set of five injection cycles performed in each channel are shown in figure 
31. 
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procName 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
Channel A 
PO G-SO Sensitivity 
32768 8192 15.25-124 
32768 8192 24.91909 
32768 8192 19.34426 
32768 8192 19.6825 
32768 8192 20 
32768 4096 24.29022 
32768 4096 20.63492 
32768 4096 25.23077 
32768 4096 19.0476 
32768 4096 15.9874 
32768 2048 21.93548 
32768 2048 16.19048 
32768 2048 2 1.29032 
32768 2048 16.129 
32768 2048 14.9206 
32768 I 20 73579 
32768 I 19.72318 
32768 I 25.53846 
32768 I 1774194 
32768 I 23.49206 
32768 None 21.84615 
32768 None 20.96774 
32768 None 16.825-1 
32768 None 21.5873 
32768 None 21.63009 
SO of SOs: 
Average SO: 
SO of Averages: 
Average of averages: 
so Average 
3.43229 19.84002 
3.80095 21.03818 
3 .26069 18.09318 
3.08736 21.44629 
2.1194 20.57134 
0 .628739061 
3 .140140299 
1.319274278 
20.1977996 
procName PO G-SO Sensitivity 
Channel B 32768 8192 12.7778 
Channel B 32768 8192 14.07407 
Channel B 32768 8192 16.111T I 
Channel B 32768 8192 12.5925 
Channel B 32768 8192 17.037 
Channel B 32768 4096 14.81481 
Channel B 32768 4096 13.33333 
Channel B 32768 4096 16.48148 
Channel B 32768 4096 16.1111 
Channel B 32768 4096 13.4328 
Channel B 32768 2048 13.40782 
Channel B 32768 2048 14.62963 
Channel B 32768 2048 12.40741 
Channel B 32768 2048 15.92593 
Channel B 32768 2048 15.9259 
Channel B 32768 I 11.66667 
Channel B 32768 I 16.11111 
Channel 8 32768 I 15.58442 
Channel 8 32768 I 10.37037 
Channel 8 32768 I 16.48148 
Channel 8 32768 None 13.72913 
Channel B 32768 None 16.2963 
Channel B 32768 None 11 .50278 
Channel B 32768 None 15.95547 
Channel B 32768 None 16.85185 
SO ofSOs: 
Average SO: 
SO of Averages: 
Average of averages: 
so Average 
1.98848 14.5185 
1.46295 14.8347 
1.55296 14.45934 
2.81666 14.04281 
2.22374 14.86711 
0.548860549 
2.008960344 
0.33463212 
14.5444908 
Figu re 30 - Sensitivity results for both MVD channels 
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Figure 31 - Sensitivity results for each set of injections 
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7.4 Sensitivity to Common-mode Failure 
Although these results are of interest, of even more interest is gauging the sensitivity 
of the channels within the overall MVD system to common-modal failure. This is calculated 
by analysing the results of each injection-cycle, identifying the scope of each test that 
resulted in error, and categorizing this based on the error description; this was done for both 
channels. For each channel, the number of failures for each error description were then 
calculated as a percentage of the total number of tests performed on that channel. It is 
important to note that because each channel has a different number of scopes, the total 
number of tests performed on ea~h channel are different. For each error type, the percentages 
for each channel were divided by 100 and multiplied together to gain the percentage chance 
of common-mode failure for that error type within that injection-cycle. By collating these 
resultant common-mode probabilities, the overall probability of a common-mode failure 
occurring within that injection-cycle as a result of faults being injected can be discovered. 
The results for every injection cycle are shown below; header of each table lists the 
standard deviation passed into the Gaussian function for that particular test (or "none" if a 
normal distribution was used), the name of the channel, and the number of tests performed 
on that channel (in brackets). Following this, the first column in each table lists the error that 
was observed, and the second and third columns refer to the number of the code scope in ' 
which injections were made to cause the error; the number in brackets in the second and third 
columns is the percentage probability that this error will occur on any given injection within 
the injection cycle. The fourth column gives the probability value (between 0 and 1) that the 
relevant error will manifest itself following injections in both channels; this is calculated by : 
Pab =Pax Pb 
100 100 
where Pa is the percentage chance of channel A failing with the relevant error, Pb is the 
percentage chance of Channel B failing with the relevant error, and Pab is the probability 
(between 0 and 1) that both channels will fail with the relevant error at the same time. The 
bottom row in the table gives the sum of the probabilities calculated in column 4; this is the 
overall probability that for any random injection into channel A and channel B, the same 
error will manifest itself in both (i.e. a common mode failure). This value is multiplied by 
100 and placed in brackets to give the percentage figure. 
For example, the following table is the result of an injection cycle that perturbed 
variables based on a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of 8192, with Channel A 
having been subjected to 295 tests, and Channel B subjected to 540 tests: 
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Channel B (540) ' ' Standard Deviation: 8192 Channel A (295) 
25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 13,13, 58, 58, 58 Crane One dropped blank 25,25,25 (0.92592%) 0.00025 (2.71186%) 
Workstation 1- blank 13, 17, 26, 26, 26, 52, 53, 54, 63, 64, 
exceeded time limit 26,28,60 73 0.00030 (2.71186%) (1.11111 %) 
0.00055 
(0.055%) 
In this test, two errors with the potential for common mode failure were discovered; 
one error manifests itself by crane one dropping a blank, and the other manifests itself by a 
blank placed in workstation 1 exceeding its time limit. For Channel A, the first error- "Crane 
One dropped blank" - was seen 8 times, all as a result of injections into scope 25 of the 
Channel's code. As 295 tests had been performed, this leads to a I 00 I 295 x 8 = 2. 71186% 
chance that this error will be seen on any given injection. The same error was seen in Channel 
B five times; two times following an injection into scope 13 and three times following an 
injection into scope 58. This leads to a 100 I 540 x 5 = 0.92592% chance of the error being 
seen on any given injection. The overall probability that following random injections both 
channels will manifest the same error is therefore 
2.71186 X 0.92592 = 0.00025 
100 100 
The same process is repeated for the other error with the potential for common-mode 
failure- "Workstation 1- blank exceeded time limit", where there is a 2.71186% chance that 
the error will be seen in Channel A on any given injection, a 1.11111% chance that the error 
will be seen in Channel B on any given injection, and an overall probability of 0.00030 that 
the error will be seen in both channels when random injections are made into each channel. 
When the two probabilities for common-mode failure are summed together, an overall 
probability for common-mode failure of 0.00055 is established. By multiplying this by 100, 
an overall percentage probability of 0.055% is obtained. The results for all other injection 
cycles performed are listed in appendix A, in the same format. 
This data is summarized in figure 32. As can be seen, these results are very 
promising; out of more than 20,000 tests performed, despite faults being injected into the 
system, the probability of common-mode failure occurring is only approximately 0.049% 
with a standard deviation of approximately 0.035, with the "best" result being a probability of 
0.005% and the "worst" results being a percentage chance of common-mode failure of 
0.115%. However, it is important to remember that the results collected from the FITMVS 
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system do not allow for any non-independence of error weightings (i.e. related errors in two 
separate channels) to be taken into consideration. 
G-SD 
8192 
8192 
8192 
8192 
8192 
4096 
4096 
4096 
4096 
4096 
2048 
2048 
2048 
2048 
2048 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
%chance of CMF SD 
0.055 
0.114 
0.0275 
0.036 
0.115 0.04227 
0.051 
0.075 
0.095 
0.049 
0.005 0.033734 
0.016 
0.026 
0.071 
0.008 
0.024 0.024536 
0.02 
0.015 
0.0532 
0.096 
0.0845 0.036645 
0.108 
0.028 
0.021 
0.028 
0.0195 0.037713 
Overall average: 
Overall SO: 
Average 
0.0695 
0.055 
0.029 
0.05374 
0.0409 
0.049628 
0.035284 
Figure 32 - Overall analysis of common-mode failure 
Although for this experiment there is no obvious way to generate related errors 
amongst diverse channels, should we assume that doing so results in the probability for 
common-mode failure increasing by 20 fold (slightly more than the factor [HAT97] 
hypothesized for the [KNI86] experiment) then results still seem to be promising - with a 
worst-case probability of 0.115 x 20 = 2.3% chance of common-mode failure should a 
random fault be injected in each channel. 
It is important to note, however, that this analysis of potential common-mode failure 
does not take into account any tests that resulted in a time-out; in other words, a situation in 
which both channels fail to reply within the expected period of time is not regarded as 
common-mode failure. This is due to the sheer volume of timeouts reported; for Channel A, 
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a total of 1220 time-outs occurred from 7812 tests performed, whilst Channel B produced a 
total of 1291 time-outs from 13399 tests. Figure 33 details the percentage probability of a 
timeout occurring on a given test for each injection cycle. The first column refers to the 
standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution (if applicable), the second and third columns 
detail the percentage probability of a test resulting in a time-out for Channel A and Channel 
B respectively, and the fourth column shows the probability that both channels will time-out 
on any given test. 
SD 
8192 
8192 
8192 
8192 
8192 
4096 
4096 
4096 
4096 
4096 
2048 
2048 
2048 
2048 
2048 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Normal Distribution 
Normal Distribution 
Normal Distribution 
Normal Distribution 
Normal Distribution 
Standard Deviation: 
Average: 
Channel A% 
7.79661 
12.13115 
20.06472 
16.19048 
15.55556 
17.46032 
18.61199 
14.76923 
14.92063 
14.10658 
19.67742 
18.38710 
12.69841 
14.83871 
12.69841 
13.04348 
21.84615 
16.26298 
9.35484 
16.50794 
12.00000 
14.92063 
18.70968 
19.68254 
17.55486 
3..41766 
15.59161% 
ChannelB% 
7.40741 
8.33333 
8.88889 
9.44444 
12.22222 
11.85185 
9.44444 
9.81481 
10.55556 
10.63433 
10.80074 
8.14815 
10.66667 
11.85185 
11.66667 
9.46197 
6.85185 
11.48148 
5.92593 
8.51852 
11.11111 
6.86456 
9.83302 
10.74074 
8.53432 
1.74360 
9.64219% 
% Common<Timeout 
0.57753 
1.01093 
1.78353 
1.52910 
1.90123 
2.06937 
1.75780 
1.44957 
1.57496 
1.50014 
2.12531 
1.49821 
1.35450 
1.75866 
1.48148 
1.23417 
1.49687 
1.86723 
0.55436 
1.40623 
1.33333 
1.02424 
1.83973 
2.11405 
1.49819 
0.41147 
1.50962% 
Figure 33 - Analysis of time-out probabilities 
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In order to determine whether or not each time-out result will cause a common-
mode failure, it would be necessary to look-up the injection in the FITMVS log file, 
manually perform this injection on the channel source code, compile and execute that code, 
and then manually observe the operation of the channel up to the point where a time-out 
occurs. Even if this process were to only take 5 minutes, this would still .require 2511 x 5 = 
12,555 minutes (209.25 hours) of testing time, which is not feasible for this experiment. 
However, as can be seen from figure 33, the average probability of both channels 
timing out on a given test is 1.50962%. If we are to assume that all time-outs lead to 
common-mode failure (an extremely unlikely assumption), then summing this probability 
with the average probability of common-mode failure shown in figure 32 would still lead to 
an average probability of common-mode failure of only 1.559248% (ignoring any weighting 
for related errors). 
7.5 Sensitivity to Error of Each Program Scope 
In addition to measures with regard to sensitivity and common-modal failure, the 
FITMVS log results also give an indication as to the sensitivity to error of each scope within 
the source code tested. Figure 34 shows the number of errors detected following injections 
into each scope in the two channels tested; this is created by grouping together all the rows 
of each FITMVS log file that contained an error message, and then creating a histogram 
graph based upon the scope number of the injection. This analysis does not include time-
outs. 
These results are of interest as they reveal that certain program scopes are far more 
prone to error (and are hence far more sensitive) than other scopes. A good example of this is 
scope 51 in channel B, responsible for a total of 105 reported errors. This metric is very 
useful as it provides a picture of the sensitivity of each channel's source code that can be 
assessed very quickly. By identifying scopes of special sensitivity and testing/coding them to 
behave more robustly, it should be possible to reduce the overall sensitivity of each channel 
significantly. 
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Figure 34 - Errors detected per program scope for both channels tested 
The same analysis can also be performed to see which scopes have a high sensitivity 
toward common-mode failure; this is shown in figure 35. This is created by grouping 
together all errors in each FITMVS log file that had the potential for common-mode failure 
as described in section 7.4. 
As can be seen, the results of this analysis show little change from the results 
displayed in figure 34, but may help in further refining the overall picture of each channel's 
sensitivity. It should be noted that the scale of the vertical axis in figure 34 and figure 35 is 
different, as the set of errors with the potential to be common-mode failures was smaller than 
that of set of all errors. 
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Figure 35 - Common-mode failures detected per program scope for both channels tested 
7.6 Error Frequency Analysis 
Finally, an analysis was performed to see what types of error occurred most 
frequently in each channel. This is created by grouping together all the rows of each 
FITMVS log file that contained an error message, sorting them based on the error 
description, and then counting each group of errors. The results of this analysis are shown in 
figure 36. 
This analysis reveals that some specific types of error occur far more often than 
others; in Channel A, error types 6, 8, and 12 occur with most frequency, whilst in Channel 
B, error types 1, 9, 13, 19 and 20 occur with most frequency. 
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Figure 36 - Error type frequency for both MVD channels 
A detailed breakdown of each error type is given for both channels in figure 37 and 
figure 38. 
# Error Description Frequency 
1 Blank in WS One picked up before minimum time elapsed 10 
2 Blank in WS Three picked up before minimum time elapsed 3 
3 Blank in WS Two picked up before minimum time elapsed 4 
4 Blank passed through system, but exceeds maximum system time 6 
5 Blank processed at too few workstations 2 
6 Crane one dropped blank - Factory::checkCraneMagnets() 54 
7 Crane two dropped blank - Factory: :checkCraneMagnets() 2 
8 Workstation 1 - blank exceeded time limit. 189 Factory::checkWorkstations() 
9 Workstation 2 - blank exceeded time limit. 7 Factory: :checkWorkstations() 
10 Workstation 3 - blank exceeded time limit. 1 Factory: :checkW orkstations() 
11 Workstation 4 - blank exceeded time limit. 6 Factory: :checkWorkstations() 
12 Workstation used more than once 76 
Figure 37 - Error type frequency breakdown for Channel A 
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# Error Description ~ c ¥ f5reguency: 
1 Blank in WS One picked up before minimum time elapsed 40 
2 Blank in WS Three picked up before minimum time elapsed 6 
3 Blank in WS Two picked up before minimum time elapsed 22 
4 Blank passed through system, but exceeds maximum system time 13 
5 Blank processed at more than 4 workstations 3 
6 Blank processed at too few workstations 16 
7 Blank put back down on the end of the feed belt 4 
8 Blanks processed out of order 5 
9 Crane one dropped blank - Factory::checkCraneMagnets() 156 
10 Crane one has put a blank into workstation 1. lt already has a blank in 13 it 
11 Crane one has put a blank into workstation 2. lt already has a blank in 12 it 
12 Crane one has put a blank into workstation 4. lt already has a blank in 2 it 
13 Crane two dropped blank - Factory::checkCraneMagnets() 40 
14 Crane two has put a blank into workstation 1. lt already has a blank in it 3 
15 Crane two has put a blank into workstation 2. lt already has a blank in it 3 
16 Crane two has put a blank into workstation 3. lt already has a blank in it 9 
17 Crane two has put a blank into workstation 4. lt already has a blank in it 14 
18 hasBiankExceededLimit: blank inside illegal workstation 1 
19 Workstation 1 - blank exceeded time limit. 226 Factory::checkWorkstations() 
20 Workstation 2 - blank exceeded time limit. 57 Factory: :checkW orkstations() 
21 Workstation 3 - blank exceeded time limit. 13 Factory: :checkW orkstations() 
22 Workstation 4 - blank exceeded time limit. 11 Factory: :checkW orkstations() 
23 Workstation used more than once 2 
Figure 38 - Error type frequency breakdown for Channel B 
From this analysis, the system developer may wish to more thoroughly exercise 
exception handling mechanisms related to these errors, in order to increase the safety of the 
system as much as possible. It will also be possible to use an analysis such as this to rank 
common-mode failures by their· severity and also count the number of common-mode 
failures that result in system failure, thus providing more MVD metrics 
A related analysis to the one mentioned above is to assess the frequency of common-
mode failures in the two channels; that is, the frequency of errors with the potential to lead to 
common-mode failure. This is shown in figure 39. Figure 40 details a breakdown of the 
common-mode failure frequency data. 
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Figure 39 - Common-mode failure Frequency in Channel A and Channel B 
- - Channel A ChanneiB # Error Description Frequency Frequency TOTAL 
1 Crane One Dropped Blank 54 75 129 
2 WS 1 - blank exceeded time limit 189 215 404 
3 Blank passed through system but exceeds Max Sys 2 1 3 
Time 
4 Blank in WS1 picked up before min time elapsed 4 7 11 
5 Blank in WS2 picked up before min time elapsed 2 5 7 
6 WS 2 - blank exceeded time limit 6 12 18 
7 Blank processed at too few workstations 2 2 4 
8 Workstation used more than once 4 2 6 
9 WS 3- blank exceeded time limit 1 1 2 
10 WS 4 - blank exceeded time limit 1 1 2 
11 Blank in WS3 picked up before min time elapsed 1 1 2 
Figure 40 - Common-mode failure type frequency breakdown for Channel A and Channel B 
It can also be seen that two of the errors - "Crane One Dropped Blank" and 
"Workstation 1 - Blank Exceeded Time Limit" - occur frequently in both channels. The 
exact reason as to why this is the case will require further investigation at the source code 
level, but nevertheless this analysis gives developers extremely useful information to 
investigate. 
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7.7 Issues with FITMVS Arising from the Experiment 
At the conclusion of the experiment, a number of limitations with the current 
FITMVS system were apparent. The system does not recognise objects, and hence cim only 
perturb primitive variable types, not objects or class variables. An example of this is shown in 
figure 41. 
void function () 
{ 
} 
int a; 
long b; 
Object theObject =new Object(); 
11 FITMVS can perturb either primitive 
11 variable, such as : 
A = A + 43; 
11 or 
B = B + 20; 
11 but does not recognize objects and so 
11 could not, for example, do as follows: 
theObject->variable = theObject->variable + 20; 
Figure 41 - Code example of what FITMVS can and cannot perturb 
The reason for this is the lack of sophistication in the FITMVS parser components, 
stemming from the lack of development time available. In an age of object-oriented 
technologies, this is obviously an issue that will need to be addressed in the future, as many 
potential perturbations were ignored by the system and an even greater insight into the two 
channels may have been missed. 
Another issue to arise as a result of the experiment is that of the "time-out problem". 
In order to resolve whether or not time-outs will produce common-mode failure across 
channels, it is currently the case that the user must manually study the FITMVS log file, 
manually perform the specified injection, and then manually evaluate the execution of the 
channel. Although this is possible for a small number of time-outs, as noted in section 7 .4, an 
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average of just over 10% of tests performed resulted in a time-out, and so such a manual 
analysis is unfeasible. An investigation is therefore needed into alternate methods for 
analysing time-outs between channels. 
Perhaps the most profound problem of all is the inability ofFITMVS (and perhaps the 
fault injection approach as a whole) to accurately model non-independence of failure. Every 
experimental analysis of MVD systems has shown that the probabilities of channels in MVD 
systems failing are not dependant of each other, although no research appears to have been 
performed on modelling this relationship between channels. Due to the fact that different 
channels will have different variable names, different structures, different functions and 
different objects, it is simply not possible to insert the "same" fault into more than one 
channel (unless perturbing input data). Therefore, all injections performed are completely 
independent of each other and so a non-independence relationship cannot be established 
between channels. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter details the results of the experiment performed, together with an 
analysis as to what these results mean. Examples of the FITMVS log files produced by the 
experiment are shown, analyses are performed to give channel sensitivity analysis, channel 
sensitivity to common-mode failure, program scope sensitivity analysis, program scope 
sensitivity to common-mode failure, error frequency distribution analysis and common-mode 
failure frequency distribution analysis. The chapter concludes by examining issues that arose 
with the FITMVS system as a result of the experiment. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusions 
The primary goal of this research has been to develop a system capable of 
automatically injecting faults into an MVD system and then testing the system for its 
behaviour. Such a system is desirable as multi-version design has been proposed as a method 
for increasing the dependability of critical systems beyond current levels, but lack of 
quantitative characterizations is a major obstacle to large-scale commercial usage of the 
approach. The technique of fault injection provides much potential for generating large 
numbers of metrics. Fault injection is a "late life-cycle" software analysis that can simulate 
human operator errors and observe their impact on the software as well as the total system. It 
is a technique that complements, but is not a substitute for, other verification and validation 
procedures. By developing a fault injection system (FITMVS), it was hoped to provide a 
method for generating large amounts of data about both an MVD system as a whole, as well 
as its constituent channels. 
The result of this has been very successful, and as a result, not only has a valuable 
tool for the production of detailed metrics into MVD systems been produced, but extremely 
useful metrics about a lmown MVD system have been produced also. The automated nature 
of the FITMVS system has also allowed for a much greater number of tests to be performed 
than might otherwise have been the case (21 ,211 tests automatically performed compared to 
the 4,320 tests performed manually over a much greater time period in a previous study). The 
following analyses can be produced using the FITMVS system: 
1) Channel Sensitivity Analysis. This metric allows the user to gauge how 
likely a channel within an MVD system is to fail when a fault is injected 
into it. The user may then wish to invest more resources in channels with a 
high sensitivity to faults. 
2) Channel Sensitivity to Common-mode failure. This metric is related to 
channel sensitivity analysis, but applies to the MVD system as a whole. 
This analysis is useful as it helps to refine dependability estimates for a 
MVD system by giving the user an indication of how likely the system is to 
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fail through common-mode failure, assummg a single random fault Is 
injected into each of its constituent channels. 
3) Program Scope Sensitivity Analysis. This analysis generates a graph 
showing the number of errors that were produced following injections into 
each scope within a channel's source code. This allows the user to assess at 
a glance which scopes are more sensitive to faults than others; the user may 
then wish to either perform increased tests on these scopes, debug them, or 
introduce more effective exception-handling routines in them. 
4) Program Scope Sensitivity to Common-mode failure Analysis. This analysis 
is similar to the program scope sensitivity analysis, and produces a graph 
showing the number of errors with the potential for common-mode failure 
that were produced following injections into each scope within a channel's 
source code. A user may find this analysis helpful in assessing which 
scopes are in most urgent need for maintenance (assuming that the MVD 
system will be able to handle non-common-mode failures generated by 
scopes). This analysis may also be extremely useful in future research 
investigating the exact causes of the related-error phenomenon. 
5) Error Frequency Distribution Analysis. This analysis measures the number 
of occurrences of each type of error reported during the course of testing by 
FITMVS. This analysis can help the user to detect which errors occur most 
frequently when a fault is present, and allows them the opportunity to 
allocate more resources to the development of exception-handling routines 
for these errors and/or investigate why the errors are so common. 
6) Common-mode Failure Frequency Distribution Analysis. This analysis is 
similar to the error frequency distribution analysis, but measures the 
number of occurrences of each type of potential common-mode failure 
reported during testing. This enables the user to develop more effective 
exception-handling routines for the MVD system as a whole. 
The MVD system tested was a trivial example, but nevertheless, the results gained are 
extremely satisfactory as a proof-of-concept, and show great promise, with the sensitivity to 
potential common-mode failure in particular being surprisingly low, whilst the sensitivity 
metrics for each channel appear to confirm earlier tests [TOWO 1 a, TOWO 1 b] into their 
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relative dependabilities which established channel B as being the more dependable channel. 
The program scope metrics were successful in establishing specific scopes in both channels 
with disproportionate sensitivity results, whilst the error type frequency analysis revealed a 
number of errors that were far more common than others when faults were injected into either 
channel. The common-mode failure type frequency analysis was also very useful, as it 
isolated two types of error that were by far the most likely to occur in the event of a common-
mode failure. 
The MVD system chosen as a test example required several seconds to perform each 
test, and so the total number of tests that could be performed was limited; other applications 
may not have this speed restriction, and hence much higher numbers of tests may be 
performed and the resulting statistics may have a more fine-grained resolution. 
As has been stated earlier, the FITMVS system is very much a proof-of-concept 
system, but the potential for improvement in the future is great. The current system provides a 
method for extracting the much needed quantitative characterizations that are required by the 
fault-tolerant distributed-computing community [KIMOO] and can therefore be considered to 
be very much a success. 
8.2 Future Work 
There is great potential for future work both on the implementation of FITMVS and 
the application of FITMVS. On the implementation side, perhaps the most pressing need is 
for a better parser. The current parser within the FITMVS system cannot handle objects, and 
can only parseC and C++. Improvements in the parser should also allow for a wider choice of 
possible injections; currently the FITMVS system only supports data value perturbation; 
however, one possible goal in the future is to provide the possibility of code mutation as well. 
Changes to the parser may include further work on the existing parser, or the replacement of 
the existing parser with a ready-made/commercial parser. Another improvement to the system 
would be the implementation of an analysis component; currently the system outputs a very 
detailed log file, but the actual metrics and analyses of this file have to be done semi-
manually (the log file is tab-delimited and should import into most modem spreadsheet 
applications). By giving the user the option of automatic analysis of the output logs, the 
overall time taken to gain results should be much reduced. 
There are also a number of promising research directions in which FITMVS may be 
helpful. The most profound of these is an investigation into related errors; currently, there is 
no understanding as to the relationship between errors and common-mode failures. By using 
the analyses offered by FITMVS, it may be possible to investigate relationships between 
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scopes that are more likely to cause common-mode failure, and perform reverse engineering 
to gain a greater understanding of the underlying causes. It is also of interest to analyse the 
results of FITMVS on other MVD systems in order to see if there are any underlying patterns 
or trends in the data extracted. Although the automated testing mechanism has increased the 
number of tests that were able to be performed significantly, the fact that the MVD system 
tested waited on the system timer prohibited a truly large number of tests from being 
performed, and therefore an alternative MVD system that does not wait on the system timer 
will enable a more rigorous analysis. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix lists the results of the analysis for common-mode probabilities 
performed on every injection cycle. The format of these results is detailed in section 7 .4. 
Sta.odard Deviation: 8192 Channel A (315) Channel B (540) 
Workstation I - blank 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 44, 52, 53, 54, 63, 
exceeded time limit 34,34,50,50,56 121 0.00035 (3.1 7460%) (1.11111 %) 
Workstation 2 - blank 34 65,92 0.00001 
exceeded time limit (0.31746%) (0.37037%) 
0.00036 
(0.036%) 
Staadard Deviation: 8192 Channel A (305) Channel B (540) 
Blank in Workstation 1 picked 29,29,29 19, 25, 52, 95 , 106, 112 0.00010 
up before minTime elapsed (0.98360%) (1.111 11 %) 
Blank in Workstation 2 picked 29 32,81 0.00001 
up before minTime elapsed (0.32786%) (0.37037%) 
2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3 3 1' 31' 32, 51, 51, Crane One dropped blank 51,51,51 0.00038 (2.62295%) (1.48148%) 
I 2, 13, 27, 27, 27, 7, 7,30,38, 44,52, Workstation 1 - blank 53, 54, 63, 68, 73, 
exceeded time limit 27,34,34,34 121 0.00065 (2.95081%) (2.22222%) 
0.00114 
(0.114% ) 
Standard Deviation: 8192. Channel A (309) Cbannel B (540) 
Blank in workstation l picked 28 44 0.000005 
up before time limit expired (0.32362%) (0.18518%) 
29, 29, 40, 40, 40, 
Crane One dropped blank 2 40, 40, 40, 51, 51, 0.00007 (0.32362%) 5 1,51,51 
(2.22222%) 
Workstation 1 - blank 15, 54, 54, 54, 56 24, 24, 24, 52, 54, 
exceeded time limit (1.61812%) 63, 94 0.00020 (1.29629%) 
0.000275 
(0.0275%) 
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Standard Deviation: 8191 Channel A (315) Channel B (540) 
15, 17, 28, 28, 28, 24, 24, 24, 29, 29, 
Work:station 1 - blank 28, 33,33, 33, 33, 52, 53, 54, 58, 63, 0.00114 
exceeded time limit 34,34,51 64, 83,84, 98, 98 
(4.12698%) (2.77777%) 
Work:station 2 - blank 34 65, 92, 121 0.00001 
exceeded time limit (0.31746%) (0.55555%) 
0.00115 
(0.115%) 
Standud Deviation: 4096 Channel A (315) Channel B (540) 
Workstation 1 - blank 12, 17, 28, 28, 28, 44, 52, 54, 73, 93, 
exceeded time limit 31 , 31, 31,31 107, 114, 119, 121 0.00047 (2.85714%) (1.66666%) 
Work:station 2 - blank 15, 28 64, 121 0.00002 
exceeded time limit (0.63492%) (0.37037%) 
0.00049 
(0.049%) 
Studard De¥1adon: 4096 Channel A (319_} Channel B (536) 
Crane one dropped blank 2, 3 51 0.00001 (0.62695%) (0.18656%) 
Workstation 1 - blank 12, 35 44, 52, 54, 114 0.00004 
exceeded time lirnjt (0.62695%) (0.74626%) 
0.00005 
(0.005%) 
Standard Deviation: 4096 Channel A (315) Channel B (540) 
13, 16, 32, 32, 34, 22,24, 24,24,44, Workstation I - blank 34, 34,57 54, 65, 68, 112, 0.00051 
exceeded time limit 121 ,130 (2.53968%) (2.03703%) 
0.00051 
(0.051 %) 
Studard Deviation: 4096 Channel A (317) Channel B (540) 
2 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, Crane One dropped blank (0.31545%) 51 , 51 , 51 , 51 , 51 0.00005 (1.85185%) 
12, 14, 15, 17, 31, 2, 2, 22,22, 22, 44, Workstation 1- blank exceeded 31, 31, 31, 34, 51 , 
time limit 56 53, 54, 63, 68, 92 0.00070 
(3.47003%) (2.03703%) 
0.00075 
(0.075%) 
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StaDdard Deviation: 4096 Chaonel A (325) Channel 8 (540) 
2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3 21, 21 , 51 , 51 , 51, Crane One dropped blank 51, 51 0.00027 (2.15384%) (1.29629%) 
12, 26, 32, 33, 34, 27, 44, 52, 54, 63, Workstation 1- blank 34, 34, 54, 54, 54, 64, 67, 73, 92, 107 0.00068 
exceeded time limit 54,56 
(3.69230%) (1.85185%) 
0.00095 
(0.095%) 
Standard Deviation: 2048 Channel A (315) Channel 8 {540) 
15, 16, 28, 28, 28, 3, 3, 9, 53, 54, 63, Workstation 1 - blank 68,73, 79,92, 103, 
exceeded time limit 28,29,34,34,34 107 0.00070 (3.17460%) (2.22222%) 
Workstation 2 - blank 17 8, 27 0.00001 
exceeded time limit (0.31746%) (0.37037%) 
0.00071 
(0.071%) 
Studard Deviation: 2048 Cbaooel A (310) Cbaonel 8 {540) 
Workstation 1- blank 17, 57 53,54, 63, 64, 73, 74, 109 0.00008 
exceeded time limit (0.64516%) (1.29629%) 
0.00008 
(0.008%) 
Standard Deviation: 2048 Gbannel A (315) Chaonel 8 (540) 
Workstation 1- blank 3, 3, 3, 4, 5 5, 20, 20, 20, 44, 52,54,63 0.00023 
exceeded time limit (1.58730%) (1.48148%) 
Workstation used more than 26, 26 122 0.00001 
once (0.63492%) (0.18518%) 
0.00024 
(0.024%) 
Standard Deviation: 2048 Channel A (310) Channel B (537) 
Workstation 1- blank 12, 29, 29, 29, 29, 54, 63, 64, 68 
exceeded time limit 35, 57 (0.74487%) 0.00016 (2.25806%) 
0.00016 
(0.016%) 
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Standard Deviation: 2048 Channel A (310) Channel B (540) 
Workstation 1 - blank 13, 28, 28, 28, 28, 44,52,54,63, 105 
exceeded time limit 33,33,33,33 (0.92592%) 0.00026 (2.90322%) 
0.00026 
(0.026%) 
Standard DeviatioA: 1 Channel A (289) Channel B (540)_ 
Blank processes at too few 50 38 0.000006 
workstations 1 0.34602%) (0.18518%) 
Crane one dropped blank 2 51 O.E>00006 (0.34602%) (0.18518%) 
21,21 ,2 1, 23, 23, 
Workstation 1 - blank 26, 33,33,33,55 23, 28, 28, 28, 52, 54, 60, 63, 67, 68, 0.0005 1 
exceeded I (1.73010%) 121 
(2.962961Vo) 
Workstation used more than 63, 63 64 0.00001 
once (0.69204%) (0.18518%) 
0.000532 
(0.0532%) 
Standard Deviation: 1 Channel A (310) Channel B (540) 
26, 26, 26, 28, 28, 
Workstation 1- blank 28, 27, 29, 29, 29, 21' 23, 24, 52, 54, 
exceeded time limit 34, 34, 34, 54, 54, 68, 73, 92, 121 0.00096 54,54,57 (1.66666%) 
(5.80645%) 
0.00096 
(0.096%) 
Standard Deviation: 1 ChaDBel A (315) Channel B (540) 
Blank processed at too few 53 26 0.000005 
workstations 1 0.31746%) (0.18518%) 
12, 12, 29, 29, 29, 10, 10, 53, 58, 67, 
Workstation 1 - blank 29,50,53,65,65, 73, 77, 87, 88, 121 , 0.00084 
exceeded time limit 65,65,65 125 
(4.12698%) (2.03703%) 
0.000845 
(0.0845%) 
Standard Deviation: 1 Channel A (299) Channel B (539) 
Blank passed through system 39,65 118 0.00001 
but exceeds max time (0.66889%) (0.18552%) 
Workstation 1 - blank 13, 32, 33, 33 22, 29, 29, 29, 38, 0.00019 
exceeded time limit (1.33779%) 59,63,121 
(1.48423%) 
0.00020 
(0.02%) 
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Standard Deviation: 1 Channel A {325) Channel B (540) 
2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 51, 51 , 51 Crane One dropped blank 3 (0.55555%) 0.00015 (2.76923%) 
0.00015 
(0.015% ) 
Normal Distribution Channel A (310) Channel B (539) 
Workstation I - blank 16. 17, 31, 32, 32 21, 21, 21 , 26, 52, 53,63 0.00020 
exceeded time limit (1.61290%) (1.29870%) 
Workstation 2 - blank 13 65, 92, 121 0.00001 
exceeded time limit (0.32258%) (0.55658%) 
0.00021 
(0.021% ) 
Normal Distribution Channel A (315) Channel B (540) 
Workstation 1- blank 13, 16, 27, 27, 27, 21 ' 29, 29, 44, 52, 
exceeded time limit 27 53, 54, 63 0.00028 (1.90476%) (1.48148%) 
0.00028 
(0.028%) 
Normal Distribution Channel A {319) Channel B (539) 
Blank in workstation 3 picked 28 85 
up before minimum time (0.31347%) (0.18552%) 0.000005 
elapsed 
Blank in workstation 2 picked 28 63, 121 , 121 
up before minimum time (0.31347%) (0.55658%·) 0.00001 
elapsed 
23, 23, 40, 40, 40, 
Crane one dropped blank 2, 3 40, 51 , 51 , 51, 51, 0.00012 (0.62695%) 51 
(2.04081%) 
3, 44, 52, 54, 63, 
Workstat1on I - blank 15 73, 76, 83, 87, 90, 0.00006 
exceeded time limit (0.31347%) 99 
(2.04081%) 
0.000195 
(0.0195%) 
Normal Distribution Channel A {315} Channel B {539) 
Workstation 1- blank 13, 17, 33, 33, 33, 22, 22, 22, 44, 53, 
exceeded time limit 33 54, 63, 92 0.00028 (1.90476%) {1.48423%) 
0.00028 
(0.028%) 
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Normal Distribution Channel A (325) Channel 8 (540) 
2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, Crane One dropped blank 51, 51, 51,5151 0.00045 (2.46153%) {1.85185%) 
15, 17, 17, 20, 31, 44, 52, 54, 63 , 73, 
Workstation 1 - blank 31 , 31, 31 , 50, 50, 74, 75, 90, 92, 121 0.00062 
exceeded time limit 53 
(3.38461%) (1.85185% ) 
Workstation 3 - blank 33 121 0.000005 
exceeded time limit (0.30769%) (0.18518%) 
Workstation 4 - blank 1 44 0.000005 
exceeded time limit (0.30769%) (0.18518%) 
0.00108 
(0.108%) 
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